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ABSTRACT 
Paramilitary-style active shooter attacks in a multi-hazard environment are an emerging 
threat against the U.S. homeland. Lessons learned from previous paramilitary style 
attacks demonstrate the breaking points of the fire service policy of “standing by” until 
law enforcement declares that the scene is secure. When followed, the “standby” policy 
prevents fire fighters from taking calculated risks to accomplish the fire service mission 
of saving lives and protecting property. It is likely that the “standby” policy will be 
ignored when immediate action is required to save lives or mitigate hazards in areas of 
the incident in which the potential for violence, but no active threat exists. 
The optimal fire service response policy to save lives and mitigate hazards during 
paramilitary style attacks in a multi-hazard environment is a “force protection” model in 
which law enforcement officers accompany and protect fire fighters in the warm zone. 
This model is an adaptation of the successful “escort” model used by law enforcement 
and fire fighters during civil unrest incidents. As has occurred many times in the past, the 
fire service must incorporate a new core mission competency—warm zone operations at 
paramilitary style attacks. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The next al-Qaeda-style attack on the American homeland featuring multiple 
simultaneous strikes against unarmed civilians is not likely to be hijacked planes flown 
into occupied buildings. Nor is it likely to be suicide bombers or backpack bombs 
directed against public transportation. The nature of the 9/11-quality terrorist threat has 
evolved since 9/11, Madrid, and London. The November 26–28, 2008 attack against 
Mumbai, India–also known as the 26/11 attacks—most likely represents the next stage in 
catastrophic terrorist attacks against the American homeland.  
Although the 26/11 attacks may herald the arrival of a new era in catastrophic 
terrorist attacks, Mumbai also represents the return of a threat that has previously 
humbled the American fire service1: paramilitary style active shooters who use fire as a 
weapon. The paramilitary style assault by two students at Columbine High School in 
1999 revealed serious shortcomings in the fire service “standby” policy at active shooter 
incidents, a policy that requires fire fighters to wait outside areas of potential violence 
until law enforcement has declared the scene to be secure. The lessons of Columbine—
and now 26/11 Mumbai—reveal that the “standby” policy prevents fire fighters from 
taking calculated risks to save lives or mitigate life threatening hazards during a 
paramilitary style attack. Unless the Fire Service finds a way to move beyond the 
“standby” policy—and into the “warm zone” of potential violence—then fire fighters will 
remain unprepared for the next paramilitary style attack against the U.S. homeland. 
1. Definition of Paramilitary Style Active Shooter Incident in a Multi-
Hazard Environment  
The paramilitary-style active shooter terrorist attack is known by several names: 
complex, active shooter incident; swarming; and Mumbai-style assault. The focus of this 
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis, the author focuses on the fire service and use terms, such as ‘fire fighters’ 
instead of ‘fire/ EMS personnel.’ This usage is not to diminish the importance of single function emergency 
medical services personnel; rather, the jurisdiction in which the author works is fire/based EMS—all fire 
fighters are emergency medical technicians and all paramedics are fire fighters. 
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policy analysis is limited to ‘paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard 
environment,’ a term that can be broken down into three specific components. (1) Single 
or multiple assailants armed with multiple weapons and weapon types, are using ballistic 
protection, and are tactically disciplined (paramilitary). (2) The assailants present an 
ongoing, immediate threat to life (active). When law enforcement engages the assailants, 
they do not surrender or commit suicide–although they may expect to die in their 
confrontation with law enforcement. The attackers return fire and attempt to evade or 
relocate to continue the killing. (3) To extend the duration and scope of the killing, the 
assailants create a multi-hazard environment for responders. A multi-hazard environment 
includes firearms plus one or more dangerous conditions that imperil life and the safety 
of victims and responders, such as fire as a weapon; secondary devices; building collapse; 
rope rescue; confined space; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive 
(CBRNE); and/or other fire department core competencies. 
Although this inquiry focuses on multi-hazard environments, the analysis may 
also be applicable to active shooter incidents involving ballistic threats exclusively. 
Furthermore, although discussion about paramilitary-style active shooter attacks occurs 
primarily in the domain of homeland security, such attacks are not the exclusive domain 
of radical Islamic terrorists. The motivation of the assailants at North Hollywood in 1997 
(armed robbery), Columbine in 1999 (anger), and the Beltway snipers in 2002 (political), 
is evidence that not all marauding shooters are religiously inspired. Lone wolf shooters 
reflect a similar range of motivations, from the al-Qaeda inspired Major Hassan (2009) to 
Virginia Tech in 2007 (mental health) and Oslo, Norway in 2011 (political).  
Regardless of the motivation, it is only a matter of time before another 
paramilitary style attack in a multi-hazard environment occurs on U.S. soil. When that 
time arrives, lives will hang in the balance. The fire service must be prepared. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What is the optimal fire department policy for safe and rapid access to victims in 
need of rescue or hazards in need of mitigation at paramilitary-style active shooter 
incidents in a multi-hazard environment? 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The shootings at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999 were a novel event 
for the U.S. Fire Service. The United States Fire Administration (USFA) described the 
Columbine shootings as “an unprecedented terrorist-style assault using numerous semi-
automatic weapons and nearly 100 improvised incendiary and explosive devices.”2 
Although violent incidents were not new to the fire service, Columbine represented first 
contact with paramilitary-style active shooters in a multi-hazard environment.  
The USFA report made it clear that the “standby” policy may not be the optimal 
approach to this unprecedented threat: “terrorist-style emergencies place unique demands 
on public safety providers and demand nontraditional responses and tactics, especially in 
the presence of multiple casualties (emphasis in original).”3 The USFA report also 
recognized that even fire fighters operating a safe distance from the shooting could be in 
danger: “During terrorist-style assaults, emergency responders are likely targets, and thus 
should practice and use exposure and risk reduction strategies as they carry out their 
emergency assignments.”4 
In developing the Observations and Lessons Learned section of its Columbine 
report, the USFA drew upon the “law enforcement escort” model described in its 1994 
“Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force on Civil Unrest: Recommendations and 
Operations During Civil Disturbance.”5 The Civil Unrest report was in response to the 
worsening nature of violence on American streets in the early 1990s: “The protests of the 
1960’s seem tame in comparison to recent civil unrest disturbances. Rather than peaceful 
demonstrations, police and fire departments today are faced with urban-guerilla warfare 
tactics.”6 
                                                 
2 “Wanton Violence at Columbine High School,” United States Fire Administration (USFA) Technical 
Report Series, April 1999, 1. 
3 Ibid., 1–2. 
4 Ibid., 3. 
5 “Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force on Civil Unrest: Recommendations for Organization and 
Operations during Civil Disturbance,” FEMA and USFA, FA-142, February 1994.  
6 Ibid., 45. 
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One of the key findings of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force was the need for law 
enforcement and fire department collaboration during incidents of ongoing violence.  
We must recognize that during a riot or civil disturbance the responsibility 
to fight fires and deliver emergency medical service rests not only with the 
Fire Department, but also with the Los Angeles Police Department, which 
is charged with the critical responsibility of protecting fire fighters and 
paramedics from the threat of armed, hostile individuals. Fire Department 
personnel do not carry weapons; they depend on law enforcement to 
protect them and, without adequate protection, they simply cannot do their 
job.7  
The Joint Fire/Police Task Force recommended that law enforcement escorts 
accompany fire fighters providing fire suppression or emergency medical services into 
potentially dangerous areas. These escorts would comprise police officers who were 
dedicated exclusively to protecting fire fighters; they could not be called away from 
escort duty to perform other police functions.8 The task force also recommended the use 
of body armor for fire fighters in areas of potential violence.  
All personnel with the potential of entering the impact area should always 
be protected with body armor… Departments should ensure that there are 
enough bulletproof vests to outfit all personnel who may potentially 
operate in the impact area. Suppliers should be identified (e.g., the 
military) in case there is unforeseen need for more body armor and other 
protective gear.9 
Although the Joint Fire/Police Task Force was written about civil disturbances, 
the USFA’s Columbine report applied these lessons to active shooter incidents. 
Among the many conclusions that can be drawn from this incident, the 
need to develop and apply exposure reduction methods beyond traditional 
tactics is a major finding. These preventive measures would likely include: 
Fire service/Emergency Medical Services (EMS) use of protective 
antiballistic garments; Law enforcement escorts during hostile, interior 
operations.10  
                                                 
7 “Report of the Joint Fire/Police Task Force on Civil Unrest,” 11.  
8 Ibid., 19. 
9 Ibid., 46. 
10 “Wanton Violence at Columbine High School,” 30. 
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Despite the USFA recommendations, many fire departments responded to 
Columbine by training tactical medics—including the Littleton Fire Department, which 
trained 15 special weapons and tactics (SWAT) paramedics with federal funding.11 
Furthermore, at least two applied research papers submitted to the National Fire 
Academy as part of the Executive Fire Officer Program advocated the use of tactical 
medics.  
In his 2000 applied research paper for the National Fire Academy, Frank McElroy 
recommended that the Saint Johns County, FL, Department of Emergency Services 
provide SWAT medic training for fire fighter paramedics. Based on the results of his 
research, McElroy also found that fire departments needed to prepare for violent 
incidents that exceeded the capabilities of tactical medics. 
Fire fighters also have a history of performing extremely dangerous 
activities beyond the scope of their training and equipment when such 
actions were the only way to save a life… it is reasonable to assume that 
fire fighters will continue to place themselves in great danger to rescue 
those who would otherwise die, whether the dangers involved are from a 
fire or hostile gunmen.12  
McElroy concluded that fire departments that do not have policies in place to guide 
decision making during violent incidents “outside the normal scope of operations” may 
be subject to, “intense local or even national criticism for failing to prepare and train for 
such incidents.”13 
Kent Davis, in his 2009 applied research paper for the National Fire Academy, 
collected surveys from 116 fire departments.14 According to Davis, “This research has 
demonstrated that not only the CFD [Charlotte Fire Department] but the fire service in 
general is not prepared to respond to ASI’s [Active Shooter Incidents] and take action 
                                                 
11 Susan Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New Kind of 
Terrorism Sequel,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program, C16-01-1612.1, 2001, 8. 
12 Frank McElroy, “Firefighters’ Role at School or Workplace Violence Incidents,” Applied Research 
Paper for the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program, February 2000, 26. 
13 Ibid., 27. 
14 Kent Davis, “Charlotte Fire Department Responses to Active Shooter Incidents—A Critical 
Analysis,” Applied Research Paper for the National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer Program, July 
2009, 56. 
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beyond the standby mode.”15 Davis found that 68% of fire department survey 
respondents did not have written procedures in place for handling active shooter incidents 
that went beyond ‘standby mode.’ Davis recommended tactical medics as the policy 
option that would enable the Charlotte Fire Department to play an active role at ongoing 
active shooter incidents. He proposed maintaining on-duty tactical medics at three 
centrally located fire stations to maintain a response capability of four tactical medics to 
approximately 95% of the city within 10 minutes. Davis also recommended that 
appropriate ballistic protection be provided to operate in an active shooter environment.16  
After the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the need for public safety agencies to provide 
effective rescue and hazard mitigation in potentially hostile areas became more urgent. 
Arlington County, VA developed the concept of Rescue Task Forces after the “standby” 
policy during a large-scale Mumbai-style active shooter drill led to an hour-long delay in 
patient care while law enforcement secured the scene. Arlington County identified this 
delay as the ‘basic problem’ with the “standby” policy: “While waiting for a secure 
scene, those injured inside the building aren’t receiving care and are dying from their 
injuries.”17  
When Arlington County researched, “the weapons used by active shooters, the 
patterns of morbidity/mortality, and the medically austere conditions in which active 
shootings have taken place, it became clear to our department that civilian active shooter 
scenarios presented similar conditions and injuries as in combat.”18 According to the data 
on which Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) is based, one fifth of combat casualties 
are from three types of wounds readily treated in the field: extremity exsanguination,  
 
 
                                                 
15 Davis, “Charlotte Fire Department Responses to Active Shooter Incidents—A Critical Analysis,” 
59. 
16 Ibid., 61–62. 
17 Blake Iselin and E. Reed Smith, “Arlington County, VA, Task Force Rethinks Active Shooter 
Incident Response,” Journal of Emergency Medical Services, November 30, 2009, 
http://www.jems.com/print/4622. 
18 Iselin and Smith, “Arlington County, VA, Task Force Rethinks Active Shooter Incident Response.” 
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tension pneumothorax, and airway obstruction. A patient has the best chance of surviving 
one of these types of ballistic injuries when the wound is stabilized within moments of 
the injury.19  
The TCCC approach to active shooter injuries redefined Arlington County’s 
response to these incidents: “It’s no longer acceptable to stage and wait for the affected 
area to be cleared by the police; doing so defeats all principles of TCCC and can result in 
a number of preventable deaths.”20 Rescue Task Forces are a type of law enforcement 
escort that deliver Arlington County paramedics to the side of a patient with a gunshot 
wound quickly and safely. Each Rescue Task Force consists of two patrol officers and 
two Arlington County paramedics. The Rescue Task Force moves along corridors that 
have been cleared by law enforcement into areas in which assailants are not operating. 
All Arlington County medics are trained in Rescue Task Force operation and are 
provided with ballistic protection.21  
A number of authors have also recommended consolidating police/fire 
capabilities in specialized teams that combine the weapons expertise of law enforcement 
with the fire fighting and emergency medical services expertise of fire fighters. Some fire 
departments have added weapons capability to fire fighters by arming tactical medics. In 
Clayton County, GA, tactical medics are trained to become Georgia Peace Officers. 
These tactical medics are then assigned law enforcement uniforms, body armor, and a 
firearm secured in a locked gun vault until they are deployed to an incident.22  
Theodore Moody, in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, argued for the “cross-
disciplinary tactical integration of police-fire-medical services.”23 He made clear that his  
 
                                                 
19 Iselin and Smith, “Arlington County, VA, Task Force Rethinks Active Shooter Incident Response.” 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Mary Rose Roberts, “On the Front Line,” Fire Chief Magazine, August 1, 2010, 
http://firechief.com/ems/paramedic-cross-training-201008/. 
23 Theodore Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial Response 
in the Age of Urban Jihad” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, September 2010), 65. 
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thesis was not advocating “formalized consolidation of police-fire-medical services”24 
but only the “consolidation of line–or tactical level–operations with our fire and EMS 
partners.”25  
According to Moody, the fire service “standby” policy will fail catastrophically in 
a paramilitary style attack on the U.S. homeland. Moody argued that unless fire fighters 
are able to operate in the most dangerous areas of a violent incident, lives will be 
unnecessarily lost, “Organizational paradigms that exclude fire and medical personnel 
from hot zone operations are naïve and will not stand up to the test of a Mumbai or 
Beslan visited upon the United States.”26 For Moody, the consequences of the “standby” 
policy are predictable–and preventable, “Sluggishness in tactical response, delays in 
medical evacuation and treatment, and degraded ability to address explosives mitigation 
and firefighting during ongoing tactical operations are vulnerabilities we are aware of and 
can begin to mitigate.”27 To prevent the failure of the “standby” policy, Moody 
recommended that non-law enforcement first responders make the paradigm shift to 
“combat fire fighting and rescue.”28 
Although Moody did not fully describe how his cross-disciplinary tactical teams 
would operate on a daily basis, Sean Newman clearly articulated one version of a 
consolidated police/fire team in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis—SWARM Units: 
Syndicated Water-Enabled, Anti-Siege Response Matrix Teams comprised of cross-
trained fire fighters and police officers. Similar to Moody, Newman did not propose 
formalized agency-wide consolidation, “The paper is not suggesting a department-wide 
merger but tests the idea of small, elite inter-agency units to maximize first responder 
effectiveness in one specific type of incident.”29 
                                                 
24 Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial Response in the Age 
of Urban Jihad,” 61. 
25 Ibid., 54. 
26 Ibid., 57. 
27 Ibid., 61. 
28 Ibid., 66–67. 
29 Sean Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police 
Units Facing Paramilitary Terrorism” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2011), 2–3. 
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According to Newman, improved coordination between police and fire units is 
inadequate to address the unique challenges of paramilitary style terrorism; full 
police/fire integration is necessary. 
Global trends in active shooter terrorism may force firefighters to operate 
in an active, hostile environment, and not just in the aftermath of attacks. 
Currently, compartmented standard operating procedure for first 
responders does not adequately address active shooter terrorist attacks 
when fire and explosives are combined with conventional firearms. To 
face this new threat, police and fire departments need more than 
coordination, but better integration.30  
The advantage of consolidated teams, such as Newman’s SWARM units, is that 
they are capable of mitigating the use of fire as a weapon. However, consolidated teams 
are still at the conceptual stage of development and face a number of implementation 
obstacles. The lack of an established fire service capability to mitigate fire as a weapon in 
the warm zone during a paramilitary attack leaves a gap that must be filled. The fire 
service is in search of a policy alternative that combines the ability of Arlington County’s 
Rescue Task Forces to operate in the warm zone to rescue patients and the ability of 
Newman’s SWARM teams to operate in the warm zone to mitigate life-threatening 
hazards, such as fire as a weapon. 
D. HYPOTHESIS 
Law enforcement escorts for fire fighters in potentially hostile areas—also known 
as force protection—is the optimal fire department policy for safe and rapid access to 
victims in need of rescue or hazards in need of mitigation at paramilitary-style active 
shooter incidents in multi-hazard environments. 
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
Paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment have the 
potential to inflict catastrophic loss of human life, cause a severe loss of confidence in 
public safety officials, and traumatize the affected community. These types of attacks are 
                                                 
30 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 1. 
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designed to overcome counter-terror security measures, overwhelm emergency response, 
and extend the killing and carnage for as long as possible while capturing the attention of 
the world.  
It is imperative that fire fighters and law enforcement be prepared for these rare 
yet catastrophic attacks. Previous attacks have demonstrated that the fire service 
“standby” policy is not adequate to the challenge of a paramilitary-style active shooter 
incident in a multi-hazard environment. Emerging alternatives to the “standby” policy 
offer partial solutions to the multi-faceted challenges of these attacks, but no single 
approach to date has offered a holistic solution to the problem. 
This inquiry seeks to determine the optimal fire service response policy for 
paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment. The optimal 
policy will enable fire fighters to save lives and mitigate life-threatening hazards in 
potentially violent areas. 
F. METHOD 
The methodology for this thesis is policy analysis.31 
The study of fire service response policies to paramilitary-style active shooter 
incidents in a multi-hazard environment currently lacks an analytical framework. In this 
inquiry, the author begins to build such a framework.  
Two events define the paradigm of paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a 
multi-hazard environment: The shootings at Columbine and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai. 
In addition to these two seminal events, this inquiry examines a number of key events at 
which the lessons learned are instructive to developing an effective fire service response 
to paramilitary style attacks in multi-hazard environments. Several patterns emerge from 
these lessons that can be used as criteria to differentiate between successful and 
unsuccessful response policies. In addition to establishing evaluative criteria, this inquiry 
categorizes the diverse range of response policies into a small number of clearly 
distinguishable policy alternatives.  
                                                 
31 Eugene Bardach, A Practical Guide for Policy Analysis, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press), 2009. 
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One criterion at a time, the likely outcome of each policy alternative is evaluated 
against a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment. Based 
on the likely outcomes of these policy alternatives, the optimal policy for a paramilitary-
style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment is determined.  
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE THREAT OF PARAMILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST THE U.S. 
HOMELAND CONTINUES TO EVOLVE 
In the decade since 9/11, the nature of the terrorist threat against the U.S. 
homeland has evolved. In the years immediately following 9/11, homeland security 
agencies were primarily concerned with another catastrophic al-Qaeda-style attack 
against the U.S. homeland that featured multiple, simultaneous attacks.32 These fears 
were aggravated by the multiple bombings in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the multiple 
bombings in London on July 7, 2005, and the arrests in the United Kingdom on August 9, 
2006 that prevented the attempted bombing of several transatlantic passenger airplanes.  
In more recent years, however, the terrorist threat has trended away from 
coordinated catastrophic attacks toward simple attacks by lone wolf perpetrators. 
Terrorism experts Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, writing in a 2010 report for the 
Bipartisan Policy Center entitled, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” argued that the ability 
of al-Qaeda or its affiliates to conduct a large-scale attack had been severely degraded by 
a number of operational and strategic factors—particularly the increase in overseas drone 
attacks starting in 2008.33 To compensate, al-Qaeda has adopted a strategy of 
“diversification.”34 The new strategy, “seeks to flood already stressed intelligence and 
law enforcement agencies with ‘noise’: low-level threats from ‘lone wolves’ and other 
jihadist ‘hangers-on.’ This ‘low-hanging fruit’ is designed to inflict as much damage as 
possible, but also to distract law enforcement and intelligence personnel from more 
serious terrorist operations, allowing such plots to go unnoticed beneath the radar and 
thereby succeed.”35  
                                                 
32 Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” Bipartisan Policy Center, 
September 10, 2010, http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/assessing-terrorist-threat, 31. 
33 Ibid., 20. 
34 Ibid., 18. 
35 Ibid., 18–19. 
 14
The shift toward simpler attacks may conceal how important 9/11-quality attacks 
remain for terrorist organizations. Coordinated catastrophic attacks inflict not only a 
significant economic and psychological cost on the nation attacked, but they serve as an 
effective fundraising and recruiting tool for the terrorists. The continued success of the 
United States in eliminating key al-Qaeda leaders—such as Osama Bin Laden (5/2/11), 
Anwar al-Awlaki, and Inspire magazine editor Samir Khan (9/30/11)—is also putting 
pressure on al-Qaeda and its affiliates to prove that they remain a relevant player on the 
global stage.36  
B. THE RISE OF PARAMILITARY STYLE ACTIVE SHOOTINGS  
Another emerging trend in terrorist attacks is a shift from bombings to 
paramilitary style active shootings. The seminal event in the emergence of this trend is 
the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, India in 2008. According to the Intelligence Division of the 
New York Police Department, the Mumbai attack indicated a ‘major shift’ away from 
multiple simultaneous attacks with suicide bombers toward multiple groups of active 
shooters capable of broadening the scope of the carnage and prolonging the terror.37 
Since the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, numerous “Mumbai-style” paramilitary attacks and 
attempted attacks have occurred around the world against a diverse range of targets, 
including the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan in 2009,38 the General 
Headquarters of the Pakistani military in Rawalpindi in 2009,39 unknown targets in the 




                                                 
36 Philip Mudd, “Evaluating the Al-Qa-ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” CTC Sentinel 3, no. 8 
(August 2010): 3. 
37 New York City Police Department, “Active Shooter: Recommendations and Analysis for Risk 
Mitigation,” (n.d.), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/counterterrorism/ActiveShooter.pdf, 4. 
38 Jane Perlez, “For Pakistan, Attack Exposes Security Flaws,” New York Times, March 4, 2009. 
39 Bergen and Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” 28. 
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militants based in Pakistan),40 and a military entrance processing station (MEPS) in 
Seattle, WA in 2011 (foiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Seattle 
Police).41 
Evidence also exists in the pattern of attempted attacks within the United States 
that a shift away from bombings may be occurring. According to the Heritage Foundation 
website, 29 bomb plots have occurred against the U.S. homeland since 9/11, and all of 
them have been thwarted. In contrast, the only successful42 al-Qaeda inspired attacks 
within the United States since 9/11 have been shootings. Abdulhakim Muhammad 
(Carlos Bledsoe) killed one soldier and wounded another at a military recruiting station in 
Little Rock, Arkansas in 2009 and Major Nidal Hassan killed 13 and wounded 43 at Fort 
Hood, Texas, also in 2009.43  
Although lone wolves perpetrated both successful shootings, another pattern 
within the attacks against the United States points toward a future attack involving 
multiple shooters. It appears increasingly likely that a group of conspirators will plot a 
paramilitary style attack rather than a bombing. According to a Heritage Foundation 
report entitled, “40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: Combating Complacency in the Long 
War on Terror,” from September 11, 2011 until the Mumbai attacks in 2008, 13 terrorist 
plots within the United States were foiled that involved two or more individuals 
conspiring to attack a target.44 Of these multi-conspirator plots, 10 (77%) involved 
                                                 
40 Richard Norton-Taylor and Owen Bowcott, “‘Mumbai-Style’ Terror Attack on UK, France, and 
Germany Foiled,” The Guardian, September 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/sep/29/terror-
attack-plot-europe-foiled. 
41 Mike Carter, “Two Indicted in Plot to Attack Military Center in Seattle,” Seattle Times, July 7, 
2011. 
42 On March 6, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar drove his sport utility vehicle into a crowd at the 
University of North Caroline, Chapel Hill, allegedly hoping to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that 
had been killed by U.S. armed forces. No one was seriously injured in the attack, so this attack is not 
considered successful. Jerome P. Bjelopera and Mark A. Randol, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating 
a Complex Threat,” Congressional Research Service, December 7, 2010, 29. 
43 Bergen and Hoffman, “Assessing the Terrorist Threat,” 33. 
44 James Jay Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, “40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: Combating 




bombings and three (23%) involved paramilitary style attacks.45 Since 26/11 in Mumbai, 
the report lists six plots involving more than one conspirator. Three (50%) of these plots 
were bombings and three (50%) were paramilitary style assaults.46 Although the sample 
size is very small, a marked increase has occurred in the likelihood that a group of 
terrorist plotters will choose a paramilitary style attack (23% pre-Mumbai to 50% post-
Mumbai). The increased ratio of paramilitary attacks to bombings may signal an 
emerging trend in the nature of the terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland. 
C. LAW ENFORCEMENT HAS ADAPTED TO THE PARAMILITARY-
STYLE ACTIVE SHOOTER THREAT  
Modern thinking about law enforcement response to an active shooter incident 
can be traced to August 1, 1966, when Charles Whitman shot and killed 16 citizens from 
the Clock Tower at the University of Texas. Charles Whitman’s precision shooting from 
his elevated position in the Clock Tower at the University of Texas resulted in the death 
of 16 citizens—some as far as two blocks away. A civilian and two unarmored and 
lightly armed officers who stormed the top of the Clock Tower finally stopped Whitman. 
In the aftermath of the shootings, Police departments identified the need for specially 
trained and equipped officers to confront extremely dangerous active shooters. This line 
of thinking gave rise to the creation of SWAT teams and the ‘contain-and-wait-for-
SWAT’ policy for patrol officers. First-responding law enforcement officers to an active 
shooting would establish a perimeter and wait for the SWAT team to confront the 
shooter.47  
October 17, 1991, can be marked as another turning point in police active shooter 
tactics. Instead of establishing a perimeter and standing by for the SWAT team, seven 
police officers took immediate action and engaged George Hennard after he crashed his 
                                                 
45 Carafano and Zuckerman, “40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11.” The three paramilitary style plots 
include Virginia Jihad in 2003, Jamiyyat ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS) in 2005, and the Fort Dix Six in 2007. 
46 Ibid. The three post-Mumbai paramilitary style plots include Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad 
Abousamra in October 2009 (Boston), Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh in May 2011 (New York), 
and Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh (Seattle) in June 2011. 
47 Rick Armellino, “Protecting Citizens from Killers Takes Bravery, Aggression and Speed,” 
PoliceOne.com, December 3, 2007, http://www.policeone.com/pc_print.asp?vid=1630799. 
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car into Luby’s Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas and began shooting patrons. Although 
Hennard managed to kill 23 people, the quick action of the police officers was considered 
the primary reason that Hennard was stopped before he killed the remaining citizens 
trapped inside Luby’s.48  
The officers in Killeen, Texas demonstrated that rapid police intervention could 
bring a more expeditious end to the killing than standing by for the SWAT team. A 
shooter that law enforcement has challenged is no longer free to shoot victims. If the 
assailant does not relocate and/or return fire, then the assailant will be neutralized and 
further killing prevented.49 
The shootings at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, were a landmark 
event for law enforcement response to active shooter events. Within five minutes of the 
first shots being fired, a Jefferson County Deputy had engaged the two assailants. In 
response to the Deputy’s gunfire, the two heavily armed students retreated into the 
school. Instead of following the assailants and continuing to engage, law enforcement 
officers established a perimeter and stood by for SWAT.50 During the 45 minutes it took 
for the SWAT teams to arrive and enter the first building, 10 of the 13 people killed on 
that day were shot.51  
The lesson of Luby’s Cafeteria—engage the shooter to stop the killing—only had 
to be relearned once by the law enforcement community. In the years after Columbine, 
law enforcement active shooter policy was transformed. Police now train for active 
shooter events under the assumption that an unchallenged gunman kills a victim every 15 
seconds.52 The policy of establishing a perimeter and waiting for SWAT has been  
 
                                                 
48Armellino, “Protecting Citizens from Killers Takes Bravery, Aggression and Speed.” 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jefferson County Sherriff’s Office, “The Columbine High School Shootings: Timeline of Events,” 
May 16, 2001, 
http://extras.denverpost.com/news/colreport/columbinerep/pages/NARRATIVE%20Time%20Line.htm. 
51 P. Solomon Banda, “Columbine Changed How Police React in Rampages,” Washington Post, April 
19, 1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/18/AR2009041802277_pf.html.  
52 Ibid. 
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replaced with contact teams that are formed-up by the first arriving patrol officers who 
use Immediate Action Rapid Deployment (IARD) tactics to engage the shooter(s) 
rapidly.53  
In addition to contact teams that neutralize the shooter(s), some law enforcement 
agencies also use rescue teams. A rescue team's objective is to aid the victims of the 
shooting. Rescue teams are comprised of five to six law enforcement personnel who 
become “grabbers” who retrieve the wounded and “flankers” who provide cover. The 
rescue team leader selects a safe location as a casualty collection point for the victims. 
Although the rescue team is there for patient extrication, the team becomes a contact 
team if it confronts a suspect.54 
Although law enforcement is prepared to engage active shooters rapidly to stop 
the killing, their ability to do so may be constrained in a multi-hazard environment. Sean 
Newman observed in his NPS thesis that, “what is conspicuously absent from law 
enforcement preparations for a Mumbai-type terrorist event is consideration of fire as part 
of the weapons mix.”55 To neutralize active shooters in a multi-hazard environment, law 
enforcement will require fire fighter expertise.  
D. THE FIRE SERVICE HAS STILL NOT ADAPTED TO THE THREAT OF 
A PARAMILITARY-STYLE ACTIVE SHOOTER IN A MULTI-HAZARD 
ENVIRONMENT 
The U.S. Fire Service “standby” policy finds its origin in the National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1500 (2007 Edition), Section 8.10 Scenes of 
Violence, Civil Unrest, or Terrorism. Section 8.10.1 states, “Fire department members 
shall not become involved in any activities at the scene of domestic disturbance, civil 
unrest, or similar situations where there is ongoing violence, without the confirmed 
presence of law enforcement personnel who have deemed the scene secure.” NFPA 
                                                 
53 Armellino, “Protecting Citizens from Killers Takes Bravery, Aggression and Speed.” 
54 Dave Douglas, “Jumping into the Fire,” Police: The Law Enforcement Magazine, October 2002, 
http://www.policemag.com/Channel/SWAT/Articles/Print/Story/2002/10/Jumping-into-the-Fire.aspx. 
55 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 37. 
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standards are consensus based fire service industry recommendations. Unless 
incorporated into federal occupational safety and health standards or their state equivalent 
(Washington Industrial Safety and Health Administration standards in Washington State, 
for example), NFPA standards are not mandatory and do not have the force of law. They 
are, however, considered industry ‘best practices.’  
Based on this standard, many fire departments have a “standby” or “staging” 
policy at active shooter incidents. These policies require fire fighters to wait outside of 
gunshot range until police have declared that the scene of a shooting is secure.56 
According to most “standby” policies, a scene is not secure until the active shooter(s) are 
captured or killed and law enforcement is confident that no further threats exist.  
The “standby” policy has worked well for the fire service. During routine violent 
incidents at which the arrival of law enforcement stops the violence, the “standby” policy 
keeps fire fighters at a safe distance without unreasonably delaying access to patients. 
When violence ceases upon the arrival of police, it does not usually take long for officers 
to confirm that the scene is secure and to notify fire fighters that they can access the 
scene and begin to care for the wounded.  
For fire fighters, rapid access to injured victims can make the difference between 
life and death. Fire fighters attempt to deliver trauma victims to definitive hospital care as 
quickly as possible, but certainly within an hour of the injury—known as the “golden 
hour.” There is no empirical evidence that the trauma survival rate declines noticeably 
after 60 minutes; the “golden hour” is a conceptual framework that guides decision 
making in civilian pre-hospital care trauma emergency environments. However, what has 
been empirically demonstrated is that the survival rate diminishes rapidly for trauma 
victims the longer they must wait to receive definitive hospital care.57  
 
                                                 
56 Seattle Fire Department, Policy and Operating Guidelines, Section 4004. 
57 Northwest Region EMS and Trauma Care Council, “Northwest Region Emergency Medical 
Services & Trauma System Strategic Plan July 2009–June 2012,” Submitted September 15, 2008, 
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When assailants are willing to engage the police and die in the process, police 
intervention does not stop the violence. The assailants may reposition, establish 
barricades, take hostages, move to a new location, lure pursuers into a trap, and use 
diversionary tactics—to name just a few of the wide range of options to confuse 
responders and continue the killing. When law enforcement officers are delayed in their 
ability to secure a violent scene, it is difficult for fire fighters to access, triage, package, 
and transport patients to definitive hospital care as quickly as possible.  
Even when the assailants do not wish to engage the police, it can take time to 
secure the scene. The shootings at Columbine and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, India, 
reveal that situational awareness at paramilitary style attacks is very poor in the early 
stages of the incident. When the number or location of shooters is unknown, the shooting 
is ongoing and dynamic, a large building or campus must be searched, or additional 
complications arise, such as smoke, fire, or hazardous materials, it can take hours for 
police to declare the scene secure.  
According to the “standby” policy, the reason for the delay in securing the scene 
is not relevant; fire fighters must continue to wait at a safe distance until the scene is safe. 
Even if known viable victims can be accessed with reasonable safety or if other life 
threatening hazards exist that require mitigation—such as fire as a weapon—the scene 
must first be secured. It is at dynamic incidents where it takes an extended time to secure 
the scene that the “standby” policy becomes problematic. 
The seminal event that revealed the shortcomings of the fire service “standby” 
policy was the shootings at Columbine High School. It took paramedics four hours to 
reach Dave Sanders—a known victim in a known location. Since law enforcement took 
as long as it did to secure the scene, law enforcement was the primary focus of public 
criticism for the delay.58 A more balanced analysis, however, was being conducted within 
the fire service. The United States Fire Administration, in its after action report on the 
Columbine Shootings, recognized that fire service response protocols also required 
updating, “Hostile, multi-hazard situations–including acts of wanton violence–challenge 
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the fire/EMS service to respond with nontraditional tactics…”59 The USFA 
recommended several preventive measures to reduce the risks to fire fighters at hostile, 
multi-hazard attacks, including the use of protective antiballistic garments; law 
enforcement escorts for fire fighters during “hostile, interior operations,” and “rapid 
rescue and medical intervention for tactical teams.”60 
The lessons of the USFA report failed to alter paramilitary-style active shooter 
response policy significantly in the U.S. Fire Service. As recently as 2009, in a survey e-
mailed to the fire chief of each fire department represented in the metro section of the 
International Association of Fire Chiefs, National Fire Academy Executive Fire Officer 
candidate Kent Davis found that almost 88% of respondents still required responding 
units to stage during an active shooter incident until the scene was secure.61 Davis also 
reviewed a March 2004 Roundtable article in Fire Engineering in which fire departments 
were asked, “Your department responds to shots fired in a school… Police are inside the 
building but have not yet secured the building and are still looking for the shooter(s). 
Would you allow your crew members to enter the building and bring out the injured 
children?” According to Davis, 75% of the 32 responding fire departments stated that 
they would stage outside until police had cleared the building.62 
Many reasons exist for why the lessons of the USFA report did not transform 
paramilitary-style active shooter policy in the U.S. Fire Service. A key reason is that the 
USFA’s recommendations were based on only one paramilitary style attack in a multi-
hazard environment. In fact, very few active shooter incidents occurred in the United 
States on which to base recommendations. According to the New York Police 
Department, a total of 202 active shooter incidents have occurred in the United States 
between 1966 and 2010 in which shooting fatalities went beyond the initial target of the  
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attack. Although the report does not specify which incidents involved an ongoing 
paramilitary style attack in a multi-hazard environment, very few active shooter incidents 
in the U.S. are paramilitary style attacks.63  
Since paramilitary-style active shooter attacks have been extremely rare, the 
lessons learned from the shortcomings of existing fire service response policy have not 
occurred repeatedly. Nor does a robust mechanism exist to disseminate lessons learned 
throughout the U.S. Fire Service. Due to the decentralized nature of the Fire service, no 
nationally recognized fire service doctrine and no formal change process exists that 
would enable the fire service to learn lessons collectively.64 
Another reason that the fire service has not carefully reconsidered response policy 
to paramilitary-style active shooter incidents is that the fire service culture is slow to 
change—even when change can save lives.65 Without public scrutiny or catastrophic and 
repeated policy failures, fire departments tend to rely on policies that have proven 
themselves over time. At routine violent incidents in which the arrival of police stops the 
violence, the “standby” policy has reliably worked by keeping fire fighters away from 
violent areas. In contrast, the USFA’s recommendations from Columbine—ballistic 
protection and police escorts for fire fighters during “hostile” operations—have had few 
opportunities to be proven effective under real-life conditions.  
The risks of placing fire fighters in the “hostile” areas of an active shooter 
incident may also strike fire chiefs and incident commanders at a very personal level: No 
incident commander wants to order a fire fighter into a combat zone. Furthermore, the 
death of a fire fighter in a “hostile” area of a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in 
a multi-hazard environment would likely result in lawsuits, safety investigations, public 
outcry, and internal recriminations. Although it can be argued that police departments 
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have militarized since 9/1166—especially since the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai—no 
corresponding shift has occurred in the fire service. The reluctance to adopt untested 
policies that commit fire fighters to the potentially ”hostile” areas of a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment may reflect the natural instinct to 
protect fire fighters from a danger not generally seen as a part of the fire service mission.  
The impact of the USFA report was also diluted by the national reaction to the 
9/11 attacks. In the years after 9/11, the focus was on multiple, simultaneous bombings. 
Madrid, London, and the thwarted transatlantic airlines plot kept the counter-terror focus 
on catastrophic bombings. The 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, however, were a stark reminder 
that paramilitary-style active shooter attacks in a multi-hazard environment remain an 
unanswered challenge for the fire service.  
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III. KEY EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF FIRE SERVICE 
RESPONSE TO VIOLENT INCIDENTS 
The U.S. Fire Service has not formally developed a database of key events to 
inform policy development for paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-
hazard environment. The following events were selected based on their ability to 
elucidate key challenges faced by responding fire fighters at active shooter incidents, 
especially those in a multi-hazard environment. This list also includes key events that 
illustrate recurring lessons from use of the fire service “standby” policy.  
A.  FREDDY’S FASHION MART, 1995 
On December 8, 1995 in the Bronx, New York City, Roland Smith entered 
Freddy’s Fashion Mart with a gun, took the owner and six employees hostage, and then 
set fire to the store. Initially, Police officers attempted to prevent fire fighters from 
approaching the scene. First responding Fire Department of New York (FDNY) units 
pushed through police barricades and initiated fire suppression. Despite the inauspicious 
start to their on-scene relationship, police and fire commanders eventually resolved their 
differences and began to work cooperatively. Police officers used their bullet resistant 
shields to protect fire fighters engaged in fire suppression until heat and smoke conditions 
forced police to retreat. FDNY units eventually proceeded deeper into the building 
without police protection, until they were ordered out due to structural stability 
concerns.67 
The fire at Freddy’s Fashion Mart is a good example of the extraordinary lengths 
to which fire fighters will go to save lives. Police gave the first arriving FDNY units clear 
instruction not to enter and reinforced that directive with barricades. Despite these 
compelling reasons to delay operations, FDNY units believed that inaction would imperil  
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savable lives. FDNY actions at the fire in Freddy’s Fashion Mart demonstrate that the 
action-oriented culture of fire fighting is so strong that fire fighters might even overrun 
police barricades to take action.  
The intentionally set fire at Freddy’s Fashion Mart was not a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident—it was hostage taking at gunpoint. It is relevant to this inquiry 
because the attacker was armed and it was one of the first documented instances of fire 
being used as a weapon at an active shooter incident. Despite considerable risk to fire 
fighter safety from the uncontained armed assailant, FDNY units initiated an aggressive 
fire attack. Although none of the victims could be saved, when confronted with the 
possibility of saving lives in immediate danger in an unsecure scene, FDNY fire fighters 
were willing to risk their lives. The fire at Freddy’s Fashion Mart also demonstrated that 
first-in fire fighters and police officers will innovate to protect fire fighters operating in 
potentially violent areas of an incident.  
B.  COLUMBINE HIGH SCHOOL, CO, 1999 
The shootings at Columbine High School on April 20, 1999, began with a 
diversion in an empty field almost three miles away. A timed explosive device had 
detonated, which caused a small brush fire. Police and fire units responded.68 Moments 
later, two students initiated a paramilitary style attack on their school that resulted in the 
deaths of 12 students and one teacher.  
The first students were shot at 1119 hours.69 At 1158 hours, four of those students 
were still lying on the lawn in front of the school cafeteria. Even though the scene was 
not secure, paramedics planned to rescue the victims. As paramedics approached the 
lawn, nearby police officers gave them conflicting information about the location of the 
shooters–some police officers motioned the paramedics to remain out of sight while other 
police officers waved them in to assess the injured. The paramedics, “disregarding their 
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own safety,”70 chose to take action. They positioned their vehicles on the lawn to protect 
themselves and then approached the injured students. When the paramedics came under 
fire from the assailants in the library, they grabbed the three surviving students, threw 
them into the paramedic unit, and drove away.71 One of the children rescued, Anne Marie 
Hochhalter, was estimated to be minutes away from death upon her arrival at the 
hospital.72 
Teacher Dave Sanders was in the second group of victims to be shot—at 
approximately 1126 hours. After Sanders escaped to a nearby classroom, a student called 
911 operators and informed them of Sanders’ condition and location. Just before noon, 
another student hung a makeshift sign out the window that said, “one bleeding to death.” 
At 1208 hours, the assailants killed themselves. SWAT personnel entered the building in 
which Dave Sanders was located at 1310 hours. Although Dave Sanders had been 
bleeding for over three hours, he was still alive when SWAT arrived at his side an hour 
and a half later at 1442 hours. Forty-two minutes later, when paramedics finally reached 
him at 1544, Dave Sanders was dead.73  
The death of Dave Sanders was not due to a lack of courage or initiative from 
emergency responders. The fact that most of the victims were children—and many 
responders had unaccounted-for children who attended Columbine High School—added 
to the sense of urgency among responders. However, the police, fire, and EMS personnel 
who responded to the Columbine High School shooting performed their jobs as they had 
been trained: Fire and EMS personnel stood by until SWAT had declared the entire 
building safe.  
Compliance with policy notwithstanding, criticism was severe when the 
circumstances surrounding the death of Dave Sanders became public. Numerous lawsuits 
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were filed against the responding jurisdictions. All of the lawsuits were dismissed74—
except one: the wrongful death lawsuit brought against the Jefferson County Sherriff’s 
office by Dave Sanders’ family, which was settled over three years after the shootings for 
$1.5 million.75 The words of the federal judge who presided over the settlement were 
unforgiving. He characterized the failed rescue of Dave Sanders as ‘shocking to the 
conscience’: “‘by 4 p.m., Dave Sanders' heretofore survivable wounds had become fatal 
and he died,’ the judge said. ‘I do conclude that at some point during the afternoon, the 
(police) command defendants gained the time to reflect and deliberate on their decisions. 
At that point, (they) demonstrated a deliberate indifference towards Dave Sanders' 
plight.’”76 Such condemnation from the impartial federal judiciary erodes confidence in 
all public safety agencies. 
One of the impediments to establishing a secure scene was the disorder of the 
event. Command and control over the Columbine response was very difficult to maintain. 
A Harvard case study of the shootings at Columbine, authored by Susan Rosegrant, 
succinctly described the challenges faced by the incident commanders:  
The chaotic scene that law enforcement and emergency medical personnel 
faced, however, seemed designed to frustrate their best efforts. Witnesses 
were providing conflicting reports about the number of attackers, their 
location in the building, and their ages… By the time the first Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team entered the school shortly after noon, 
the gunmen had grown quiet–removing the clear objective of an active 
target. As SWAT members moved cautiously through the school, the 
piercing sirens of fire alarms triggered by bombs made it almost 
impossible to communicate. Not only that, coordinating the growing 
crowd of responders outside had become increasingly difficult.77  
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In the words of Division Chief Chuck Burdick, Littleton Fire’s representative at 
the unified command post, the chaos at Columbine was ‘absolute overload,’ “There was 
so much information coming in, in such a short period of time, that it was absolutely 
physically impossible for any one person to get a handle an what was going on.”78 
Firefighters and law enforcement were not prepared for the multi-hazard 
environment they encountered at Columbine. The USFA succinctly summarized the 
scope of those hazards. 
During the assault, the two assailants successfully detonated over 30 
improvised incendiary and explosive devices, designed to cause numerous 
casualties. The incendiary devices included glass containers containing 
homemade “napalm” and various types and sizes of containers holding 
flammable liquids (gasoline, kerosene, and white gas). The juvenile 
offenders also deployed variously sized pressurized, flammable gas 
(propane) cylinders. The explosive devices consisted of pipe bombs of 
different sizes that were augmented with nails or pellets, or both, duct-
taped to the outside so as to increase the shrapnel yield and the number of 
casualties. Investigators later located over 60 additional undetonated 
devices in and around the school. 
The offenders also outfitted their own vehicles with incendiary and 
explosive materials that were deployed as car bombs. These vehicles were 
discovered in the parking lots adjacent to the school, and were intended as 
secondary devices to harm people fleeing from the building or to 
compromise first responders.79 
The widespread use of fire as a weapon in a multi-hazard environment contributed 
to the chaos. Fire units encountered a scene with an activated sprinkler system, an 
activated fire alarm, reports of an odor of natural gas, and an interior environment 
compromised by smoke, haze, noise, and flashing strobes from the fire alarm system.80 
An uncontrolled fire or a more successful detonation of the secondary devices would 
have further stressed the ability of responders to rescue students trapped by the fire and 
smoke. 
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The gravity of the incident contributed to the collaboration between law 
enforcement and fire fighters. The paramedic unit transporting Lance Kirklin, one of the 
severely injured students rescued from in front of the cafeteria, briefly stopped at the 
incident command post en route to the hospital. According to Littleton Fire Department 
Division Chief Chuck Burdick, “A lot of people saw Lance come through, and the 
magnitude of it was such that people realized this is too big to have petty issues between 
us. We’ve got to get through this, and the only way we’re going to get through this is 
with the support of each other.”81 
C.  BESLAN MIDDLE SCHOOL #1, RUSSIA 2004 
On September 1, 2004, as many as 49 terrorists took as many as 1,220 hostages—
most of them children—at Beslan Middle School #1 in Beslan, Russia. Over the next 62 
hours, the terrorists subjected the hostages to inhumane conditions, including 
indiscriminate killings, deprivation of food and water, assaults, and psychological 
cruelty.82 Shortly after 1300 hours on the 3rd day of the hostage taking, two explosions 
ripped through the school’s gym. Although the reason for the twin explosions is subject 
to debate, the detonations initiated a frenetic rescue that would result in 330 dead, 
including 172 children, with 700 wounded.83  
It is possible that more than half of those killed, including many children, died by 
fire. According to witnesses, the two explosions caused a small fire in the gym. After 
approximately 45 minutes, however, a “hellish fire” began to engulf the gym and, along 
with a new series of explosions, may have caused the roof of the gym to collapse–
possibly trapping any victims left alive. After the fire had been extinguished, 290-burned 
bodies were recovered from the gym; about 100 could be confirmed to have burned after 
death.84 
                                                 
81 Rosegrant, “The Shootings at Columbine High School: Responding to a New Kind of Terrorism,” 
10. 
82 John Giduck, “Terror at Beslan,” Archangel Group, 2005, 115, 117, 120–125. 
83 Ibid., 172. 
84 Kim Murphy, “Aching to Know,” Los Angeles Times, August 27, 2005.  
 31
The siege in Beslan was only a paramilitary-style active shooter event during the 
first moments as the terrorist used firearms to herd hostages into the school and to shoot 
anyone who tried to prevent their hostage taking. However, the outcome of the rescue 
effort demonstrates the destructive power of fire as a weapon—whether as a deliberate 
act or as a secondary effect of explosions. Moreover, the majority of Beslan’s victims 
were young children, which increases the sense of urgency for the responders, the 
parents, and the public. 
D.  JEWISH FEDERATION SHOOTING, WA, 2006 
On July 28, 2006, a lone gunman shot six women at the Jewish Federation of 
Greater Seattle, killing one. The assailant, before he began shooting, had announced that 
he was “angry at Israel.”85 Seattle police officers did not secure a perimeter and wait for 
the SWAT team; the first arriving officers rapidly entered the building and confronted the 
shooter. Shortly after police made contact with the assailant, he “peacefully 
surrendered.”86 
The first Seattle fire unit arrived on scene at 1606 hours and advised incoming 
units to wait until police had declared the scene secure. Four minutes later, at 1610 hours, 
police notified fire that the scene was secure and patient triage, treatment, and transport 
began.87  
At 1631 hours, a paramedic noticed that police officers were moving purposefully 
with their weapons drawn and asked command if the scene was still secure. Eight 
minutes later, at 1639 hours, a fire department division commander announced over the 
radio that SWAT might have an at-large suspect on the roof of the building. The Fire 
department incident commander advised all units to stay under cover until the situation  
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was resolved. It took 14 minutes (until 1653 hours) for SWAT to confirm that the roof of 
the building was clear, during which time at least one seriously injured patient (triaged 
red) was moved under cover to a medic unit for transport to hospital.88  
Events during this incident highlight the complex, dynamic nature of active 
shooter incidents. Twenty minutes into what was believed to be a stable incident, areas 
that had been declared secure were suddenly no longer secure. In fact, because it was 
believed that a possible second assailant was in an elevated position, the nearby streets on 
which most emergency response personnel were operating and all exit points from the 
building were now at risk.  
E.  VIRGINIA TECH, VA, 2007 
On April 16, 2007, Virginia Tech student Seung-Hui Cho killed 32 people and 
wounded 25 before committing suicide. Cho killed his first two victims in the West 
Ambler Johnston dorm hall at approximately 0715 hours and then left the scene. In 
response to the shooting in West Ambler Johnston, both Virginia Tech police department 
emergency response teams (similar to SWAT teams) were assembled. Each team 
included a tactical medic.89 
According to the official timeline, Cho first entered the Norris Hall engineering 
building around 0915 hours. It is estimated that Cho began shooting victims at 0940 
hours—shortly after chaining shut the three doors most commonly used to enter and exit 
the building. At 0951 hours, the last gunshot was heard—it was Cho committing 
suicide.90 
The Virginia Tech police department emergency response teams assembled in 
response to the twin shootings at West Ambler Johnston were immediately available to 
respond to the shootings at Norris Hall. At 0950 hours, two tactical medics accompanied 
the police emergency response teams into the building. At 0952 hours, the medics were 
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allowed to proceed to the scene of the shootings on the second floor—even though the 
scene had not been declared secure. In addition to performing triage, the paramedics 
identified several victims who required immediate medical interventions to save their 
lives. Some of the victims with penetrating wounds to their lungs required chest seals to 
stabilize their breathing. Some of the victims with severe arterial bleeding required 
tourniquets, including a 22-year-old male victim with a profuse femoral bleed for whom 
the application of the tourniquet likely saved his life. To triage and treat over 50 patients, 
the two medics directed the assistance of some of the police officers.91  
At 1009 hours, police dispatchers notified EMS command that the shooter was 
down and that the scene was secured. Fire fighters and EMS personnel began a thorough 
retriaging and rapid transportation to the hospital. The last injured patient was removed 
from Norris Hall by 1051.92 All of the patients alive after the shooting stopped would 
survive their injuries. The report concluded that, “the overall EMS response was 
excellent, and the lives of many were saved.”93 The life saving interventions performed 
by tactical medics before the scene was secure were the difference between life and death 
for a number of the shooting victims.  
The fact that Cho chained the doors reveals that he had learned from previous 
school shootings. Cho knew that by chaining the doors shut, he would increase the 
amount of time he could freely shoot victims before police could enter the building. 
Fortunately, for police, Cho’s delay tactic could be quickly overcome by equipment in 
the possession of police officers—a shotgun.  
F.  MUMBAI, INDIA, 2008 
From November 26 through 28, 2008, 10 terrorists attacked several soft targets in 
Mumbai, India, killing at least 172, wounding at least 293, and capturing the attention of 
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the world.94 The terrorists operated in four teams and attacked such varied targets as a 
rail station, a woman and children’s hospital, a popular restaurant, hotels, a Jewish center, 
and targets of opportunity—including first responders. The terrorists used guns, grenades, 
improvised explosive devices, and fire as a weapon.95  
One of the most harrowing images of the attack came from the HBO film “Terror 
in Mumbai,” in which two-year-old Baby Moshe could be seen crying next to his slain 
parents in the Jewish center on the morning of the second day. Concerned that the baby’s 
cry would draw the terrorists to the child, Sandra Samuels left her own hiding place in the 
Jewish Center to take the boy to safety.96 One of the chilling lessons of the 26/11 attacks 
in Mumbai is that even the smallest children may need rescue during a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment. 
In addition to the heroism of ordinary Mumbai citizens, Mumbai fire fighters and 
ambulance personnel also took tremendous risks to rescue civilians and injured police 
officers during the attack. Fire fighters on an aerial platform in mid-rescue were in direct 
line of sight of an armed terrorist, an ambulance driver had his windshield shattered by a 
grenade, and another ambulance worker recounted being caught in the middle of a 
firefight as he rescued an injured commando.97 In his Naval Postgraduate School thesis, 
Sean Newman described the multi-hazard conditions in which Mumbai fire fighters 
operated,  
Despite the gunfire and other dangers, the Mumbai Fire Brigade continued 
to rescue trapped hostages and fight fires in the hotels through interior 
attacks, and by using exterior ladders placed at windows to extract 
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situation, Mumbai fire fighters fought an interior attack on the 
intentionally set hotel fires with a commando escort–within earshot of 
gunfire.98 
Confronted with a novel threat, Mumbai police officers and fire fighters adapted 
and collaborated. Police officers protected fire fighters as they rescued civilians and 
police officers who had been shot—even in areas of active violence. Although 16 police 
officers and two commandos were killed attempting to stop the attackers, no fire fighter 
or ambulance attendant fatalities occurred.99  
The Mumbai attack was designed to be complex and dynamic; it was calculated to 
prevent first responders from having a clear understanding of what was occurring, where 
it was occurring, and what would happen next. Multiple terrorist teams attacked multiple 
sites and then moved on to additional sites. In one case, the assailants used a hijacked 
police vehicle to change locations. The assailants even placed diversionary bombs in 
taxis to create additional incident sites and confuse responders.100 The plan to confound 
responders intentionally succeeded brilliantly, “We thought there must have been 60 
instead of only 10.”101  
The attacks on 26/11 in Mumbai also highlight the organizational learning 
abilities of terrorists. According to a RAND Corporation analysis of the attacks, the 
tactics used by the assailants revealed, “A strategic terrorist culture that thoughtfully 
identified strategic goals and ways to achieve them and that analyzed counterterrorist 
measures and developed ways to obviate them to produce a 9/11-quality attack.”102 In a 
September 23, 2011 Homeland Security Active Shooter Awareness Virtual Roundtable, 
James McGinty, the Vice President of Training and Safety for Covenant Security 
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Services, made a case that the 26/11 Mumbai terrorists developed their tactics, in part, 
based on the shootings at Columbine. McGinty cited several aspects of the Columbine 
attack mirrored in Mumbai, including multiple shooters, extensive planning, preplanted 
IED’s for diversionary purposes, semi-automatic weapons, and weapons vests.103  
G.  AURORA, CO, 2010 
On June 25, 2010, in Aurora, CO, Adam Fisher was shot in the arm, face, and legs 
in his second floor apartment. The first police officers on-scene observed that the victim 
was losing a lot of blood and requested fire fighters, “as soon as we can get them up 
here.”104 The officer of the first responding Aurora Fire Department unit, observing the 
letter of the department’s “standby” policy, replied, “I’m not coming in until the scene is 
safe.”105 Since the police officers could not confirm the location of the shooter, however, 
they could not declare the scene safe. Seizing the initiative, the police officers carried the 
victim down the stairs and out to the curb, at which point they radioed, “It’s as safe as it’s 
going to get.”106 Fire fighters still refused to respond to the scene, so the police officers 
put the victim in a patrol car and drove to the waiting ambulance.107  
Fortunately for the Aurora Fire Department, the victim lived, “Aurora fire 
officials say they may have dodged a bullet in Fisher’s case so that they can put a new 
policy in place for the next emergency.”108 However, public reaction to the event was 
extremely critical and provoked a reversal of the ‘scene safe’ protocol:  
In response to the public outcry, Aurora Fire has changed its standard 
operating procedures to permit on-scene fire fighters to decide for 
themselves if it is safe enough to enter an assault with weapons scene to 
provide rescue or EMS care… Today, Aurora firefighters can stand by and  
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wait for police to secure the scene and request them inside or they can 
decide for themselves to enter the scene to rescue and treat people. If there 
is any question, fire and police will speak face-to-face.109  
The article does not mention if fire department personnel have been giving 
training in violent incident risk/benefit analysis, tactics, mitigation of hazards, or 
collaboration with police. The absence of such policies and training would place a 
tremendous burden on the first-in fire officer, as it would be necessary to make life or 
death decisions without the benefit of training or protocols.  
Aurora’s strict adherence to the ‘scene safe’ protocol may have deeply felt 
historical roots. In 1993, Denver firefighter Doug Konecny was shot to death climbing 
into a suicidal man's second-floor window.”110 Although it can be argued that Aurora 
may have become too risk avoidant with scene safety after the death of Konecny, their 
emphasis on fire fighter safety in unsafe scenes has kept fire fighters safe. If the fire 
captain and his crew had responded into the apartment on June 25 upon the request by 
police, the captain would have exposed his crew to considerable potential risk as the 
armed assailant was in the apartment across the hall from the victim.  
Although the events in Aurora that prompted the reversal of the ‘scene safe’ 
protocols are not a paramilitary-style active shooter incident, these events highlight the 
challenges faced by fire fighters in potentially violent situations. If the Aurora fire captain 
and his crew had entered the scene, the armed shooter would have been across the hall 
from the unarmed fire fighters. Despite the fact that the captain protected his crew from 
this risk, the public outcry was strong enough to reverse the ‘scene safe’ protocol. The 
events in Aurora, CO, also reveal the severe negative public outcry in response to fire 
fighter inaction. Even though the fire captain was correct in his assessment that 
responding to the victim’s apartment would put the safety of his crew at risk, public 
safety officials did not support his decision. Instead, the outcry and the loss of confidence 
in public safety officials prompted a reversal of the ‘scene safe’ protocols. 
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H.  ALAMEDA COUNTY, CA, 2010 
On May 31, 2011, Alameda police and fire fighters stood by while Raymond 
Zack waded into dangerous surf and eventually died. Fire fighters were on scene within 
minutes of Zack entering the water, but did not attempt rescue because they had not been 
trained in land/water rescue. In fact, due to budget cuts, the department’s water rescue 
program had been eliminated two years earlier. After almost an hour, a passerby entered 
the water and dragged Zack’s lifeless body to shore. Public condemnation of first 
responder inaction was tremendous, “It’s like you are living in a different country that 
does not care about its citizens.”111 
Although the drowning in Alameda County was not a shooting, the outcome of 
this incident illustrates key points about “standby” policies. Fire fighters did not have the 
training, equipment or protocols to enter the hypothermia-inducing, drowning-hazard surf 
to rescue a potentially violent and suicidal individual. Yet, failing to prevent an avoidable 
death diminished confidence in public safety officials; the public expected the fire 
fighters to go in harms way to rescue a man in danger. When a policy of inaction results 
in a preventable death, the importance of keeping fire fighters safe does not prevent the 
public outcry from changing those policies.  
The failure of the “standby” policy in Alameda County also resulted in a 
significant financial cost. At considerable expense, fire fighters were trained and 
equipment was purchased to put a water rescue team put back in operation. In addition, a 
lawsuit for undisclosed damages has been filed alleging the wrongful death of Raymond 
Zack.112  
I. OSLO, NORWAY, 2011 
At approximately 1532 hours on July 22, 2011, a right wing militant in Norway 
detonated a vehicle borne improvised explosive device that killed eight in downtown 
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Oslo. He then commandeered a boat and proceeded to the nearby island of Utoya, where 
a summer camp for young members of Norway’s governing Labor party was underway. 
Shortly after his arrival on the island at 1700 hours, the assailant began indiscriminately 
firing upon the youth. When police officers arrived on the island at 1825 hours, almost 90 
minutes had elapsed since the start of the killing. Moments after police confronted him, 
the assailant surrendered peacefully. By then, 68 people on the island were dead and 60 
had been injured in the two attacks.113 
Although this attack was not an ongoing active shooter incident, it is relevant to 
this inquiry because of the careful planning and paramilitary tactics used by the assailant. 
This event demonstrated the great lengths to which paramilitary assailants may go to 
circumvent counter-terrorism security measures. A manifesto written by the assailant 
detailed how he set up front companies to purchase fertilizer, a potential bomb-making 
component, without attracting suspicion. The manifesto also described how the assailant 
began taking steps to obtain a Glock-17 semi-automatic pistol legally a full six years 
before the attack.114  
On the day of the attack, the bombing in Oslo was merely a diversion. The 
assailant’s true target was a youth camp on a remote island. The assailant knew that the 
diversion and the selection of a difficult to access target would delay police response and 
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The Utoya island attack also highlights the selection of children as targets of 
violence—including some as young as 16 years of age.116 The attack was designed to 
take advantage of the trust that children have for authority figures, such as police officers. 
When the assailant arrived on the island, he was dressed as a police officer. When the 
children first approached him, the assailant stated that a bombing had occurred in Oslo 
and he was there for their protection. He then opened fire.117 
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IV. ALTERNATIVES 
A. FOUR RESPONSE MODELS 
One of the challenges of analyzing fire service response policies to active shooter 
incidents in a multi-hazard environment is that no formally recognized categories exist 
for this type of response. Each fire department has an active shooter response policy that 
may vary on a number of dimensions from other fire departments. For the purposes of 
this inquiry, four categories of fire service response policy are analyzed. The policies are 
grouped into these four general categories to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of each 
policy approach. 
To articulate some of the differences between the four fire service response 
policies to active shooter incidents, it is helpful to describe the concept of ‘control zones.’ 
Fire departments use the terms ‘hot zone,’ ‘warm zone,’ and ‘cold zone’ to distinguish 
the different levels of risk in the operating area of an incident. The control zones also 
limit which responders may operate in each zone. 
At an active shooter incident, the ‘hot zone’ is the area of operations in which a 
direct and immediate threat to persons or responders occurs, which is the area of greatest 
risk and is usually limited to law enforcement personnel. The ‘warm zone’ is the area of 
operations in which a potential hostile threat to persons or responders occurs but the threat is 
not direct and immediate. This area of potential risk is one that law enforcement or SWAT 
has not fully cleared and is usually limited to law enforcement personnel. The ‘cold zone’ is 
the area of operations in which the tactical commanders do not reasonably anticipate a 
significant danger or threat to the responders or patients. The cold zone is the area secure 
enough to set up fixed operations, such as command, medical treatment areas, and 
transportation to hospital. The outer limit of the cold zone is considered the incident 
perimeter, which is the closest point to the incident that bystanders, media, and interested 
parties are permitted to approach.118 
                                                 
118 “Rescue Task Force,” The Arlington County Fire/EMS Medical Protocols for Emergency Medical 
Services Providers, Appendix #10, IV-10-1–IV-10-6, n.d. 
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Finally, the following response models are not mutually exclusive. A fire 
department may use a “standby” policy for some incidents and a force protection policy 
for other incidents. A fire department may operate with SWAT medics and also have a 
policy for the use of force protection.  
1.  Status Quo: “Standby” in the Cold Zone Until the Scene Is Secure  
“Standby” policies require fire fighters to wait outside the scene of a violent 
incident until law enforcement declares the scene secure. Law enforcement officers and 
fire fighters perform their roles in a sequential fashion—first law enforcement neutralizes 
the suspect and secures the scene, then fire fighters perform rescue, first aid, or hazard 
mitigation.  
The Seattle Fire Department Policy and Operating Guidelines (POG) Section 
4004 “Response Guidelines” is a good example of a fire service “standby” response 
policy to violent incidents. Although POG Section 4004-2 does not specifically address 
active shooter incidents, the policy prohibits Seattle Fire and EMS units from entering an 
uncontrolled scene during an assault with weapons, “Assault with Weapons: Unit(s) 
dispatched to a situation involving assaults, including self-inflicted injuries, with 
weapons. This will indicate the need for arriving units to stand by at a safe location until 
police units have controlled the scene.”119  
Since “standby” policies prohibit fire fighters from operating in the warm zone, 
they do not include protocols describing safe and effective warm zone operations. 
Furthermore, “standby” policies do not contemplate police and fire units working 
together in the warm zone of a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard 
environment. Consequently, “standby” policies lack joint police/fire operating protocols 
to guide warm zone operations.  
                                                 
119 Seattle Fire Department, Policy and Operating Guidelines, Section 4004. 
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2.  Tactical Medics—Medical Support for SWAT Teams in the Warm 
Zone 
Tactical medics, also known as SWAT medics and TEMS (Tactical Emergency 
Medical Services), are paramedics with additional training in combat medicine equipped 
to operate in the warm zone of an active shooter incident. Their primary role is to provide 
emergency medical care for SWAT team members operating in the hot zone, but they can 
also play a rescue and/or treatment role for victims once the perpetrators of the violence 
have been neutralized. Although tactical medics are not usually armed, at least one fire 
department in Clayton County, GA, has armed tactical medics for defensive purposes 
only.120 
It can be argued that tactical medics are a type of law enforcement escort model—
the SWAT team protects the tactical medics. For the purposes of this inquiry, tactical 
medics have been given their own category because they do not perform a fire service 
role while part of the SWAT team. Tactical medics provide close medical support for 
SWAT team members, who may require moving past injured victims. After tactical 
medics have been released from close medical support, then it would be accurate to 
describe them as operating with law enforcement escorts.  
The deployment model for tactical medics varies considerably. In some 
jurisdictions, a dedicated team (or teams) of tactical medics is available with their own 
response vehicle at all times. In other jurisdictions, tactical medics perform routine fire 
fighting or emergency medical duties until they are paged to respond to an incident 
location at which SWAT is operating. Some of these tactical medics have their equipment 
with them while others respond to a designated location at which they can collect their 
equipment and/or a dedicated tactical EMS vehicle.  
                                                 
120 Roberts, “On the Front Line,” 59–70. 
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3.  Tactical-Level Consolidation—Individuals With Police/Fire/EMS 
Capability Working As a Team in the Hot Zone 
In the fire service, “consolidation” refers to the integration of a police department 
and fire department into a single agency, often called a public safety department.121 
Instead of police officers who perform a law enforcement role and fire fighters who 
perform a fire service role, consolidated departments have ‘public safety officers’ who 
are capable of performing both roles. During a paramilitary style attack, ‘public safety 
officers’ would be capable of simultaneously performing both a law enforcement role 
(neutralize the suspect and secure the scene) and a fire service role (rescue, medical 
treatment, and hazard mitigation) in the hot zone or the warm zone. 
As of this writing, a specialized, tactical-level consolidated police/fire/emergency 
medical services unit has not been deployed in an American city. However, Sean 
Newman articulated one version of consolidated police/fire units in his NPS thesis, 
“Braving the SWARM: Lowering anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
facing Paramilitary Terrorism.” SWARM Units can be thought of as a, “joint fire/police 
response unit of ‘pre-first responders’ who can enter a hostile environment ahead of 
traditional first responders.122 A SWARM team combines the agency-specific 
capabilities of fire fighters and police officers so that each team member can enter the hot 
zone and, “simultaneously engage terrorists and rescue victims in an operational 
environment that may include active shooting, explosives, smoke and fire.”123 
Police EMT/medics are another form of consolidation. These law enforcement 
officers are similar to ‘public safety officers’ except that they lack fire department 
training and expertise. Police EMT/medics response models vary considerably. In some 
cases, police EMT/medics are self-selected law enforcement officers who maintain their  
 
 
                                                 
121 Vinicio Mata, “The Contribution of Police and Fire Consolidation to the Homeland Security 
Mission” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010), 6. 
122 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 2. 
123 Ibid., 43. 
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training and certification on their own time and may be available to respond while on-
duty. In other cases, police departments may support a dedicated on-duty police 
EMT/medic capability.  
4.  Force Protection—Police Escort Fire Fighters Into the Warm Zone 
The term force protection is used to describe policies in which law enforcement 
officers escort fire fighters into the warm zone of unsecured scenes.124 The role of the 
law enforcement escort is to support the fire service role by protecting fire fighters as 
they rescue, provide medical treatment, or mitigate hazards.  
The term ‘force protection’ is a military concept that can be applied to fire 
department operations at an active shooter incident.125 Similar to the law enforcement 
escort model, it is a general model of police and fire collaboration in which a group of 
law enforcement personnel provides protection to a group of fire fighters in the warm 
zone of a paramilitary style attack. Once a force protection team of fire fighters and law 
enforcement enter the warm zone, the police officers may not deviate from the task of 
protecting the fire fighters until the fire fighters have been returned to the cold zone.  
Ideally, fire fighters entering the warm zone with law enforcement escorts should 
be provided with some form of ballistic protection. Properly fitted and maintained 
armored vests and helmets will provide some protection from projectiles, as will ballistic 
shields. However, most fire fighters do not perform routine job duties within easy access 
to ballistic protection. Some jurisdictions may have a limited amount of ballistic 
protection available in responding apparatus while other jurisdictions may expect to 
borrow ballistic protection from responding law enforcement.  
                                                 
124 The term ‘force protection’ is used for purposes of this inquiry because this term is used to 
describe the concept in the author’s jurisdiction. 
125 Adapted from JP 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, November 8, 2010, as 
amended through August 15, 2011. Force Protection: Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions 
against [DoD] personnel. 
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B.  VISUAL SUMMARY OF THE FOUR RESPONSE POLICIES 
Table 1 visually summarizes the four response models. Table 1 depicts the 
relationship between the law enforcement role and the fire department role on the 







Police & Fire 
Police Supports 
Fire 
Cold Zone “Standby”    
Warm Zone  Tactical Medics  
Force 
Protection 
Warm & Hot Zone   Consolidated ”SWARM”  
Table 1.   Description of response models based on ‘control zones’ and relationship 
between fire department role and police department role.  
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V. CRITERIA 
A. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
Paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment are 
relatively new and rare events for the fire service. As a result, a set of formal criteria with 
which to evaluate different policy approaches has not been established. Despite the 
novelty and small data set of these incidents, key patterns have emerged that can be used 
to evaluate the likely outcomes of the four policy alternatives at a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment.  
A review of several key active shooter and “standby” events described in Chapter 
III reveals six criteria that differentiate between successful and unsuccessful responses. 
Does the policy keep fire fighters safe? Is the policy consistent with fire service risk 
management principles? Does the policy maintain confidence in public safety officials? 
Is the policy effective in a multi-hazard environment, especially when fire is used as a 
weapon? Does the policy result in an expeditious response to immediate threats to life 
safety? Does the policy encourage collaboration between police and fire? In addition to 
consideration of success factors, two practical criteria shall be considered, cost and the 
political and cultural acceptability of the policy. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE EIGHT CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
1. Fire Fighter Safety 
Although fire fighters work in hazardous environments, fire fighter death and 
injury is not considered a cost of doing business. All levels of the fire service are 
dedicated to identifying the causes of death and injury and identifying policies, practices, 
training, and equipment that protect fire fighters from the hazards of the job.  
An example of the fire service’s commitment to fire fighter safety is the 
“Everyone Goes Home” initiative, a program partially funded by the Department of 
Homeland Security. Sponsored by the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, the 
organization that oversees the National Fallen Firefighters Memorial in Colorado 
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Springs, CO, “Everyone Goes Home” consists of 16 life safety initiatives designed to 
provide the fire service with a blueprint for making changes to ensure that “everyone 
goes home.”126 Life Safety Initiative #12 recommends, “National protocols for response 
to violent incidents should be developed and championed.”127 Initiative #12 
acknowledges the gaps that currently exist in fire service policy to violent incidents—
such as paramilitary style active shooters in a multi-hazard environment.  
The key incidents described in Chapter III highlight the challenge of protecting 
fire fighter safety during active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment. 
Paramedics at Columbine came under fire while rescuing students in front of the cafeteria 
and the fire fighters in Mumbai came under fire on numerous occasions. The report of a 
possible second shooter on the roof of the Jewish Federation building in Seattle 
transformed what responders thought was a cold zone into a warm zone. By their very 
nature, these incidents are unpredictable and extremely dangerous.  
Finally, a paramilitary-style active shooter incident represents a unique threat to 
fire fighter safety—“a human, adaptive enemy who will manipulate the battlespace for 
their own advantage to the detriment of first responders.”128 It will be an extraordinary 
challenge to keep fire fighters safe when one of the hazards is a thinking adversary intent 
on hurting first responders. 
A fire service policy for paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-
hazard environment must provide the highest reasonable level of safety for fire fighters. 
2. Consistent With Risk Management Principles 
Although fire fighter safety is the highest incident priority, to accomplish the 
mission of protecting life and property from fires, medical emergencies, and other 
disasters,129 fire fighters often go in harm’s way. In addition to the challenges of fire, 
                                                 
126 Everyone Goes Home, Firefight Life Safety Initiatives, http://www.everyonegoeshome.com.  
127 Everyone Goes Home, Firefight Life Safety Initiatives, 16 Firefighter Life Safety Initiatives, 
http://www.everyonegoeshome.com/initiatives.html.  
128 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 35. 
129 Seattle Fire Department Mission Statement.  
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building collapse, and hazardous materials, fire fighters must also confront incident 
complexity, confusion, and uncertainty. It is not always clear to initial responders how 
much risk they face or how likely their efforts to save a life will be. To help guide 
risk/benefit decision making under dynamic and chaotic emergency conditions, the 
National Fire Protection Association developed a risk management model known as the 
“rules of engagement,” Risk a lot, in a calculated manner, to save savable lives. Risk 
little, in a calculated manner, to save savable property. Risk nothing to save nothing.130  
Several of the key events in Chapter III highlight the risk management challenges 
confronted by first responders to paramilitary style attacks. At the Freddy’s Fashion Mart 
fire, the shootings at Columbine, and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, front line first 
responders chose to take action in potentially hostile environments when confronted with 
immediate rescues.  
The acceptance of risk can be seen as a vital part of fire service culture. A 
revealing study by the Workplace Health Group at the College of Public Health in the 
University of Georgia reviewed 1,167 recommendations from 189 line-of-duty fire 
fighter deaths investigated by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
from 2004 through 2009.131 Based on this evidence, the authors concluded: 
Operating with too few resources, compromising certain roles and 
functions, skipping or short-changing certain operational steps and 
safeguards, and relying on extreme individual efforts and heroics may 
reflect the cultural paradigm of fire fighting. This should not be construed 
as a culture of negligence or incompetence, but rather a culture of 
longstanding acceptance and tradition… The four higher order causal 
factors [of fire fighter fatalities] identified in this study may be symptoms 
of the prevailing culture of fire fighting: that the job must get done, get 
done as quickly as possible, and with whatever resources available.132 
The fire service culture of risk acceptance is not based on recklessness or 
carelessness. The fire service has developed rules of engagement to guide life and death 
                                                 
130 National Fire Protection Association Standard 1500 (2007), Annex A, Section 8.3.2. 
131 David M. DeJoy, Todd Smith, and Kumar Kunadharaju, “Line-of-Duty Deaths Among U.S. 
Firefighters: An Analysis of Fatality Investigations,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 43 (2011): 1171–
1180. 
132 Ibid., 1179. 
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decision making in uncertain, confusing, and chaotic conditions. ‘Risk a lot, in a 
calculated way, to save savable lives’ is a guideline that balances fire fighter safety with 
the urgent need for action. 
Risk acceptance is especially prevalent if victims are children. Directly or 
indirectly, children are frequently involved in active shooter incidents as demonstrated by 
the shootings at Columbine, the taking of hostages at Beslan Middle School #1, the 
shootings at Virginia Tech, Baby Moshe in the Jewish Center on the second day of the 
26/11 Mumbai attacks, the shootings at the youth camp on Utoya island in Norway, and 
the daycare in the Military Entrance Processing Service in Seattle. 
A policy for paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard 
environment should provide fire fighters with effective guidelines for risk management.  
3. Public Confidence in Fire and Police 
In general, the public expects fire fighters to handle emergencies safely, quickly, 
and effectively—especially when lives are in the balance. First responders are not 
expected to be reckless or suicidal, but they are expected to anticipate likely hazards, 
train to perform safely despite those hazards, and to take calculated risks to save lives.  
Several of the key events in Chapter III demonstrate that confidence in public 
safety officials is directly affected by the success or failure of the emergency response to 
active shooter incidents. At one extreme is the public reaction after the death of Dave 
Sanders at Columbine—intense public criticism, lawsuits, and a transformation of police 
response to active shooter incidents. On the other hand, the emergency medical service 
response to the active shooter at Virginia Tech is credited with saving a number of 
victims. One can imagine the criticism if the Virginia Tech shooting victims with life 
threatening injuries had waited without medical care for 17 minutes while law 
enforcement secured the scene—which may have occurred if the emergency response 
teams and their tactical medics had not already been mobilized in response to the two 
shooting fatalities earlier that morning in West Ambler Johnston. 
 51
Events in Aurora, CO and Alameda County, CA shed light on the consequences 
of “standby” policy failures. Even though Adam Fisher was not further harmed by the 
‘scene safe’ protocol in Aurora, public criticism led to a reversal of the policy. The 
decision to wait at the water’s edge in Alameda County resulted in the death of Raymond 
Zach. The drowning led to intense public criticism, an unlawful death lawsuit, and 
reimplementation of the water rescue program at significant expense to the jurisdiction.  
Fire fighter inaction perceived as unreasonable can also lead to public accusations 
of incompetence or indifference that may be directed at all levels of response—from the 
fire fighters to elected city officials. These accusations can lead to a loss of public support 
for the fire department, which may in turn lead to a loss of fire department funding. City 
decision makers establish budgets that reflect the community’s prioritization of the fire 
department’s ability to respond—until that response is viewed as inadequate. If the fire 
department does not maintain public support, then other pressing community needs may 
take precedence over fire department services. Reductions in fire service budgets 
adversely impact the ability of the fire department to achieve its mission. 
One of the ways that fire department leaders and elected officials may attempt to 
restore public confidence is to change policies reactively. This change can lead to training 
and resource expenses driven by the need to ‘do something’ and not by actual operational 
needs, which occurred after both the Alameda County, CA and Aurora, CO incidents. In 
the long term, reactive spending and policy implementation may not hold up as well as 
pro-actively developed policies and programs.  
Reactive attempts to restore credibility may not prevent community attempts to 
hold public safety officials responsible for the losses perceived to arise from fire 
department inaction. Citizens may file lawsuits alleging that the fire department failed to 
operate according to the appropriate standards of care. Such a lawsuit was successfully 
filed against the responding law enforcement agencies after Columbine and is pending in 
the Alameda County drowning.  
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To preserve confidence in public safety officials, a fire service policy for active 
shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment should be consistent with public 
expectations for emergency response. 
4. Adaptive to a Multi-Hazard Environment–Especially Fire As a 
Weapon 
Several of the key events in Chapter III demonstrate that fire fighters must be 
prepared to mitigate multiple hazards in a paramilitary-style active shooter incident—
especially the use of fire as a weapon. During the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the massive 
fire in the Taj Mahal hotel was intentionally set to confuse responders, trap victims, and 
create a powerful visual image that would captivate viewers around the world. During the 
shootings at Columbine, the two assailants detonated almost one third of the 90+ 
improvised explosive and incendiary devices. The resulting fires were successfully 
extinguished by the automatic sprinkler system, but created an environment with smoke, 
loud alarms, and flashing lights that created unusual shadow effects—all of which 
hindered SWAT efforts to clear the school.  
Even when fire is not used explicitly as a weapon, it is frequently a secondary 
effect of terrorist attacks and bombings. Many victims of the World Trade Center attack 
on 9/11 jumped from the upper floors to avoid the heat and smoke of the fire from the 
ignited jet fuel. The majority of victims killed during the rescue of the hostages being 
held in Beslan Middle School #1 may have been from fire. In fact, as a weapon or as a 
secondary effect, fire is so effective that William Bird, a branch chief for the Department 
of Homeland Security Intelligence and Analysis, in a September 2010 presentation on 
Mumbai-style attacks, asserted that, “Fire and fire-related injuries killed nearly as many 
victims as gunfire.”133 
The key events from Chapter III also demonstrate that paramilitary style 
assailants have learned from previous active shooter incidents and adjusted their attacks 
to confuse or delay responders. Fire fighters should expect the next paramilitary style 
                                                 
133 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 36.  
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attack to present a new and unpredicted constellation of challenges to be overcome. The 
response to an ongoing paramilitary style terrorist attack may require fire fighters to 
rescue victims trapped by a building collapse, to extricate victims tangled in ropes, 
machinery, or heavily damaged transportation vehicles, or to mitigate chemical, 
biological, radiological, and/or nuclear hazards. American counterterrorism officials 
recently warned that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is planning to use the 
lethal poison ricin in future attacks against the American homeland.134 The range of 
potential rescue scenarios at terrorist attacks that require fire service expertise is limited 
only by the imagination.  
A fire service policy for paramilitary-style active shooter incidents must guide fire 
department operations safely and effectively in a novel, multi-hazard environment.  
5. Expeditious 
Several of the key events in Chapter III demonstrate the life-saving difference that 
an expeditious response can make. Timely medical interventions most likely saved lives 
during the shootings at Columbine High School and Virginia Tech. Firefighters during 
the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai used an aerial platform to rescue dozens of victims from the 
rapidly spreading smoke and fire at the Taj Mahal hotel.  
When life is threatened, time is of the essence. One of the most important ‘best 
practices’ for trauma victims is to be delivered to definitive medical care within the 
“golden hour.” The principles of tactical combat casualty care also reflect the importance 
of providing immediate medical care to trauma victims. A rapidly moving fire may trap 
victims with flames or with dense, toxic, asphyxiating smoke. Victims pinned in a 
structural collapse may suffer from crush injuries that cause compartment syndrome—
when an extremity is pinned, metabolic toxins build, and are released when the extremity 
is freed that can cause potentially fatal heart rhythms. In high wind conditions, a 
hazardous materials plume can spread over vast areas and rapidly engulf unsuspecting 
victims. The successful resolution of an emergent condition requires an expeditious 
response. 
                                                 
134 Bruce Riedel, “AQAP’s ‘Great Expectations’ for the Future,” CTC Sentinel, August 2011.  
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A fire service policy for a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-
hazard environment should enable fire fighters to conduct fire service operations 
expeditiously. 
6. Collaborative 
Several of the key events listed in Chapter III demonstrate the value of 
collaboration between law enforcement and fire fighters at a paramilitary-style active 
shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment. Police officers used their bullet resistant 
shields to protect fire fighters as they attempted to extinguish the fire at Freddy’s Fashion 
Mart. Fire fighters used a fire engine to shield police officers making entry to Columbine 
High School. Tactical medics followed SWAT team members into Norris Hall at Virginia 
Tech 17 minutes before the scene was declared secure. Fire fighters in the 26/11 attacks 
on Mumbai braved active gunfire to rescue injured police officers.  
The value of law enforcement and fire department collaboration at paramilitary-
style active shooter incidents has been documented since the attacks on Columbine High 
School. According to the USFA’s Columbine after action report, “The lesson is becoming 
clear: Public safety managers need to reassess current response strategies in light of 
emergencies that, with increasing frequency, include wanton violence and demand a 
coordinated and joint public safety response.”135 In his NPS thesis about Mumbai-style 
attacks, Sean Newman succinctly reframed the need for police and fire collaboration in 
response to a paramilitary-style active shooter event, “This new form of terrorism is a 
direct challenge to … single-agency mitigation strategies.”136  
At paramilitary-style active shooter incidents, fire departments and law 
enforcement agencies have complementary capabilities that can overcome single-agency 
limitations. Fire fighters are not trained or equipped to operate in potentially violent 
conditions. This single-agency limitation can be overcome when police officers who are 
trained to operate safely in violent conditions escort fire fighters. Law enforcement 
                                                 
135 “Wanton Violence at Columbine High School,” 2. 
136 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 1. 
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officers are generally not trained to provide immediate medical care or mitigate fire used 
as a weapon or any other fire service hazards that may be encountered. This single-
agency limitation can be overcome when law enforcement officers escort fire fighters 
who are trained to rescue and mitigate multi-hazard environments into potentially violent 
areas.  
A fire service policy for a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-
hazard environment should permit fire fighters to collaborate with law enforcement to 
overcome single-agency limitations. 
7.  Cost 
The financial cost of a policy has a substantial impact on its feasibility. In the 
current economic environment, policy approaches to a paramilitary-style active shooter 
incident in a multi-hazard environment that require program expansion may be difficult 
to fund. Many fire departments have experienced budget cutbacks in recent years, 
including some fire departments that have laid off fire fighters. Investing in program 
expansion while other services are being cut is difficult to justify. The use of federal 
grants to fund program expansion is also becoming more difficult. Urban Area Security 
Initiative funds are facing a $2 billion cut in 2012, which are a 60%+ reduction from 
2011.137 Prioritizing funds to prepare for the highly unlikely event of a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment may be difficult to justify.  
However, several key events demonstrate that liability must also be considered as 
a cost factor. Fire departments must carefully consider what level of care is due to 
imperiled victims at a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard 
environment. The Jefferson County Sherriff’s office was successfully sued after  
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Columbine for being, “too risk averse in the first minutes of the attack.”138 The Police 
and fire departments in Alameda County, CA are currently being sued for allegedly 
violating their duty of care in the drowning death of Raymond Zach.  
Liability costs must also be considered in the event of a line of duty fire fighter 
death. Fire departments must ensure that their policies are consistent with national 
standard ‘best practices’ and state safety standards.  
A fire service policy for a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-
hazard environment should be financially cost effective. 
8. Acceptability 
The acceptability of a paramilitary-style active shooter policy to fire fighters and 
fire department executives, police officers and law enforcement executives, and elected 
officials is an important evaluative criterion. Unless a policy is acceptable to key 
stakeholders, it may not be effective in practice.  
Consolidation is one of the key issues affecting the political acceptability of a 
paramilitary-style active shooter policy. The consolidation of police departments and fire 
departments into a single agency of ‘public safety officers’ is very controversial in the 
fire service. The International Association of Fire Fighters and the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs, two of the most powerful voices in the U.S. Fire Service, are 
actively opposed to consolidation.139 A fire service paramilitary response policy that 
becomes entangled in the consolidation debate may not be politically acceptable to key 
decision-makers. 
To be acceptable to fire service leadership, a response policy to paramilitary-style 
active shooter incidents must provide fire chiefs and incident commanders with a 
compelling rationale for ordering fire fighters into a potential combat zone. Although line 
of duty deaths are an occupational hazard in the fire service, operating in the warm zone 
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of an active shooter incident is not widely recognized as a part of the fire service tradition 
or its core competencies. If a line of duty death in the warm zone of an active shooter 
incident is not consistent with the fire service tradition of risk acceptance, a response 
policy will not be acceptable to fire service leaders. 
A fire department response policy to a paramilitary style attack must also be 
acceptable to fire fighters and law enforcement. Police officers and fire fighters take 
tremendous pride in the unique culture of their respective organizations and enjoy making 
good-natured fun of the other. However, disagreements have been quite serious when the 
cultures clash over emergency response.140 At a practical level, questions as seemingly 
simple as, “When you need PD [Police Department] protection to operate a hose line, 
who is in charge?”141 may be very challenging to answer to the satisfaction of both 
cultures. 
                                                 
140 See Paul Atwater, “Firefighters Do Whatever It Takes,” Seattlepi.com, September 18, 2003, 
http://www.seattlepi.com/default/article/Firefighters-do-whatever-it-takes-1124685.php; Ian Ith, “Water 
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VI. PROJECT THE OUTCOMES  
Table 2 is a summary of the probable outcomes of each paramilitary-style active 
shooter policy as measured by each of the evaluative criteria. A “mixed” outcome 
recognizes that a policy may have good and/or bad outcomes depending on the situation.  
 




1. Safety Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed 
2. Risk Management Poor Good Good Good 
3. Public confidence Poor Good Good Good 
4. Multi-Hazard Poor Poor Good Good 
5. Expeditious Poor Mixed Mixed Good 
6. Collaborative Poor Good Good Good 
7. Cost Mixed Poor Poor Mixed 
8. Acceptability  Mixed Good Poor Mixed 
Table 2.   Likely outcome of different policies at paramilitary-style active shooter 
incident in a multi-hazard environment as measured by selected criteria 
The discussion of each outcome relies on the concept of breaking points, which 
are described by Sean Newman in his Naval Postgraduate School thesis. For the purposes 
of this inquiry, a breaking point is a set of circumstances that causes a policy to result in 
an adverse outcome.142  
A.  STATUS QUO: “STANDBY” OR “STAGE” IN THE COLD ZONE UNTIL 
THE SCENE IS SECURE  
1. Safety 
The “standby” policy at paramilitary style attacks should result in the greatest 
safety for fire fighters. If law enforcement has confirmed that all threats are neutralized, 
then it should be safe for fire fighters to enter the scene.  
However, the “standby” policy does not eliminate all risks to fire fighters at 
paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment. During a 
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paramilitary style attack, the hot zone in which violence is occurring may rapidly 
evolve—or new hot zones may appear. Fire fighters waiting in a cold zone for the scene 
to be secured may suddenly find themselves in range of armed assailants. Even fire 
fighters responding to the scene of an active shooter incident may find themselves in 
danger. Kent Davis, in his 2007 National Fire Academy research paper, stressed that the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standard of a 4-minute response time 
results in the rapid arrival of fire units to the scene of an emergency. In the confusion, fire 
units may be first on scene before the shooting stops.143 Fire fighters in the cold zone 
may also be intentional targets during an attack. For example, numerous secondary 
devices were left during the Columbine shooting, including two timer-activated vehicle-
borne improvised explosive devices in the school’s parking lot. 
Another key breaking point of the “standby” policy is the likelihood that 
firefighters will take action in the warm zone—regardless of policy. Fire fighters at the 
Freddy’s Fashion Mart fire went so far as to overrun police barricades to suppress the 
fire. Paramedics at Columbine exposed themselves to gunfire to rescue injured students 
lying on an exposed lawn. Fire fighters in Mumbai were close enough to make eye 
contact with terrorists while rescuing civilians and injured police officers. It is reasonable 
to conclude that when fire fighters are confronted with an imminent rescue in the warm 
zone, some will take action—even if this means increasing the risk to their safety.  
When fire fighters operate in the warm zone, a secondary outcome is likely to 
occur. Many “standby” policies do not prepare fire fighters to operate with safety in the 
warm zone. Some policy makers have reasoned that if fire fighters are barred from the 
warm zone, then training them to operate in potentially hazardous warm zone areas may 
send a mixed message and imply that warm zone operations are acceptable. 
Consequently, many “standby” policies do not provide warm zone protocols, best 
practices, or training. 
The “standby” policy can also reach a breaking point even when fire fighters are 
complying with the policy and waiting for the scene to be secure before making entry. If 
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bystanders feel that fire fighters are not taking appropriate action, the individuals may 
take the initiative to rescue victims, such as the Good Samaritan who pulled Raymond 
Zack from the surf in Alameda County, CA. Unfortunately, well-intentioned citizens who 
enter a hazardous scene to attempt rescue will most likely be untrained, ill equipped, and 
lack a coordinated plan. If bystanders are injured while attempting rescue, they may 
increase the pressure on fire fighters to act while simultaneously creating additional 
incident complexity. These impacts directly increase the risks to fire fighters. 
2. Consistent With Fire Service Risk Management Model 
“Standby” is a zero-risk policy. Although it is clear from the previous discussion 
that “standby” actually presents significant risks to fire fighters, the intent of the policy is 
to prevent any risk taking until the scene is secure. A zero-risk policy is not consistent 
with the fire service risk management model of risking a lot, in a calculated manner, to 
save lives.  
The “standby” policy reaches a breaking point at a paramilitary-style active 
shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment as soon as immediate rescues or fire 
fighting operations need to occur in the warm zone. The “standby” policy prohibits fire 
fighters from taking any risk—even if lives can be saved or life-threatening hazards can 
be mitigated. The likely outcome of a significant delay in fire department access to a 
multi-hazard scene—especially one measured in hours—is that trauma victims will not 
be delivered to definitive medical care within the “golden hour” and fires, hazardous 
materials, or other hazards will increase in size and severity.  
3. Public Confidence in Fire and Police Response 
At a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment, the 
likely outcome of a “standby” policy on confidence in public safety officials is poor. To 
be fair, the public does not expect fire fighters to operate in the hot zone of an active 
shooter incident. Police officers are expected to take risks while confronting violent 
assailants, not fire fighters. In the hot zone areas of active shooting, the “standby” policy 
is reasonable in the eyes of the public. 
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However, attacks similar to Columbine and Mumbai will most likely have a warm 
zone with immediate rescues and hazards that require mitigation. In these cases, the 
public will expect action. If fire fighters follow the “standby” policy and delay entry to 
the incident, their inaction will likely lead to public outcry and a loss of confidence in fire 
department officials. Moreover, if untrained bystanders take action because they are so 
frustrated with fire fighter inaction, then confidence in public safety officials will be even 
further eroded. 
A critical breaking point of the “standby” policy is that it is highly vulnerable to 
‘clever exploitation’ by attackers. An effective way to inflict psychological harm on a 
society would be to attack its most vulnerable and its heroes simultaneously. If terrorists 
successfully plan an attack in which fire fighters wait at a safe distance while children are 
in need of immediate rescue, then the loss of confidence in fire fighters and public safety 
officials would most likely be catastrophic.  
4. Adaptive to a Multi-Hazard Environment, Especially Fire As a 
Weapon 
In a novel, multi-hazard environment, the outcome of the “standby” policy is 
poor. The “standby” policy reaches its breaking point as soon as fire fighters encounter a 
novel, multi-hazard environment. If the scene is not secure, then fire fighters cannot adapt 
to novel hazards or mitigate life-threatening conditions in the warm zone; they must wait 
for the situation to self stabilize.  
5. Expeditious 
The likely outcome of the “standby” policy at a paramilitary-style active shooter 
attack in a multi-hazard environment that requires an expeditious response is poor. The 
“standby” policy reaches its breaking point as soon as immediate rescue or hazard 
mitigation is needed in the warm zone. Unless law enforcement can rapidly secure the 
scene, fire fighters must delay their operations.  
The likely outcome for victims needing rescue is improved if the law enforcement 
active shooter protocol includes law enforcement rescue teams. Although the use of 
rescue teams rapidly places a police officer at the side of a patient, this approach has 
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several adverse impacts on the response. Police officers on a rescue team are not focused 
exclusively on threat conditions in the warm zone. Rescue team officers focused on 
‘grabbing and dragging’ patients may be less safe because they will be distracted from 
changing threat indicators. The use of rescue teams may also increase the severity of the 
injury to patients. Dragging unstabilized patients can worsen extremity exsanguination, 
tension pneumothorax, airway obstruction, and spinal injury—all of which are common 
trauma injuries in paramilitary style attacks. 
6. Collaborative 
The “standby” policy is a single-agency approach to mitigation. Very little 
opportunity exists for collaboration until the scene is declared safe. Until law 
enforcement has secured the scene, fire fighters cannot enter the warm zone and cannot 
work with law enforcement to solve problems in that space.  
A critical breaking point of the “standby” policy occurs when a police officer has 
been injured or trapped in the multi-hazard environment. In fact, fire fighters who do not 
come to the aid of a fallen police officer may create an antagonistic environment between 
law enforcement and fire fighters.  
7. Cost 
In terms of operational costs, the “standby” policy imposes no financial burden in 
that it requires little training and no additional equipment. The “standby” policy also 
protects the fire department from liability and safety standard violations if fire fighters 
were allowed to work in the warm zone and became injured or were killed.  
The “standby” policy reaches a breaking point, however, when fire fighters do not 
perform immediate rescues or mitigate life-threatening hazards. If the “standby” policy 
exacerbates the impact of an uncontrolled multi-hazard environment, then the financial 
toll of the incident may worsen. If the “standby” policy results in preventable loss of life, 
then lawsuits and public criticism will follow. Although it is hard to attach a dollar figure 
to the loss of public confidence, a community that loses faith in its fire fighters will not 
provide the same financial support to the fire department budget. 
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8. Acceptability—Political and Cultural 
The “standby” policy is the default active shooter policy found in most U.S. fire 
departments. At most violent incidents, the “standby” policy keeps fire fighters out of 
harm’s way while the police secure the scene. However, the acceptability of the 
“standby” policy among fire fighters and police officers at paramilitary style attacks in a 
multi-hazard environment is in the early stages of analysis. Data from a small survey 
conducted in the Puyallup, WA fire and police departments suggest that the “standby” 
policy has poor acceptability. The survey asked fire fighters, “In your opinion, should 
Fire/EMS enter schools to rescue, treat immediate life threatening injuries, and extract 
shooting victims with a Law Enforcement Team?” Only 20% of respondent fire fighters 
(8 of 39) said, “No, not until the entire building is secured.” Police officers asked this 
question felt even more strongly. Only 4% (1 of 25) said that fire fighters should delay 
fire department operations until the entire building was secured.144  
Despite the acceptability of the “standby” policy, several of the key events 
described in Chapter III suggest that “standby” is only acceptable until it reaches a 
breaking point. Once the “standby” policy fails, the policy is no longer acceptable and is 
reversed. At an active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment, it is likely that the 
“standby” policy will reach several breaking points—such as evolving hot zones, 
immediate rescues, multiple life-threatening hazards, and the need for an expeditious 
response. If any of these breaking points are reached, then the “standby” policy will be 
judged unacceptable. 
B.  TACTICAL MEDICS—MEDICAL SUPPORT FOR SWAT TEAMS IN 
THE WARM ZONE 
1. Safety 
When evaluating the criterion of safety, the likely outcome of utilizing tactical 
medics at a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment is 
mixed. Tactical medics are trained and equipped to mitigate the risks of warm zone 
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operation and are safer as a result. However, any policy that permits fire fighters to 
operate in the warm zone before the threat has been neutralized puts fire fighters at risk of 
injury or death. Tactical medics in the warm zone are also closer to the hot zone, so if the 
hot zone evolves, they will have less time to find cover or concealment.  
The use of tactical medics, however, improves on two of the key breaking points 
of the “standby” policy. Fire fighters waiting in the cold zone until the scene is secure are 
less likely to violate the policy and enter the warm zone if they know that tactical medics 
are available. Similarly, tactical medics making immediate rescues make it less likely that 
bystanders will feel the need to take action on their own. 
2. Risk Management 
The likely risk management outcome of utilizing tactical medics is good. Tactical 
medics provide close medical support for SWAT teams in the warm zone. They have 
been trained and equipped to take calculated risks to save lives.  
A policy employing tactical medics in the warm zone reaches its breaking point if 
the deployment model delays the tactical medics from breaking away from the SWAT 
team to provide medical care for civilian casualties. If tactical medics are required to 
remain in close medical support of SWAT members until the incident is stabilized, then 
the likely outcome will be poor. Once the tactical medics are released—which may be 
much earlier than the scene is considered secure—then the likely outcome improves.  
3. Public Confidence 
At a paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment, the 
likely outcome of tactical medics on confidence in public safety officials is mixed. If 
tactical medics are required to remain in close support of the SWAT team, then they may 
have to leave immediate rescues behind, which could create the perception of 
indifference and diminish public confidence. However, tactical medics will be able to 
begin victim treatment before the scene is secure once the SWAT team no longer requires 
close medical support.  
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A second possible breaking point of tactical medics is a multi-hazard 
environment. Only tactical medics with a fire-based EMS background would be able to 
mitigate fire as a weapon or adapt to novel multi-hazard environments.  
Finally, the vulnerability of tactical medics to ‘clever exploitation’ would be 
limited to two circumstances: 1) an ongoing firefight that required them to remain in 
close medical support of SWAT team, which would prevent them from falling back and 
performing life-saving interventions, and 2) a multi-hazard environment for which they 
did not have the fire fighting or technical ability. These vulnerabilities would be difficult 
to exploit intentionally in a manner that diminished public confidence. 
4. Adaptive to a Multi-Hazard Environment, Including Fire As Weapon 
The likely outcome of tactical medics in a novel, multi-hazard environment is 
mixed. Since some tactical medics are not fire fighters, they would be limited in the 
duties they could perform. Fire-based tactical medics, on the other hand, would be 
capable of mitigating most multi-hazard environments. However, fire-based tactical 
medics might not have responded with their fire fighting turnout gear or have ready 
access to specialized fire fighting equipment. Furthermore, fire-based tactical medics may 
not have the specialized training necessary to mitigate some of the hazards, such as 
hazardous materials, building collapse, confined space, and chemical, biological, 
radiological, nuclear, or explosives.  
An additional breaking point of fire-based tactical medics is the requirement to 
provide close medical support of the SWAT team. Until the active shooting incident is 
stabilized to the point at which the SWAT team does not require close medical support, 
fire based tactical medics are limited in their ability to mitigate in a novel, multi-hazard 
environment. 
5. Expeditious 
The likelihood of an expeditious tactical medic response is mixed. Tactical 
medics can rapidly enter the warm zone, but they are only available to assist victims 
when they are no longer required for close medical support of the SWAT team. 
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Furthermore, the tactical medic deployment model may delay response time to the scene. 
While some tactical medic programs have personnel in geographically diverse locations 
available to respond immediately, other tactical medic programs are comprised of 
individuals who may or may not be on duty, who may be unavailable performing routine 
fire department or EMS duties, and who may have logistical challenges getting their 
ballistic protection and specialized equipment to the incident.  
The tactical medic policy also reaches a breaking point when the incident requires 
more tactical medics than are available. While tactical medics are responding to the 
incident, or until sufficient tactical medics are available, the likely outcome will be 
delayed fire department access to the warm zone. 
6. Collaborative 
A tactical medic deployment is collaborative. SWAT team members protect the 
tactical medics; tactical medics provide immediate life saving interventions to injured 
SWAT team members. Tactical medics and SWAT team members also have good unit 
cohesion from regularly working and training together. In a novel, multi-hazard 
environment, this work history will provide a strong foundation for tactical medics and 
SWAT team members to work cooperatively to overcome novel challenges.  
7. Cost 
Tactical medic programs are expensive. Tactical medics require equipment, 
training, possibly a vehicle, and a considerable amount of administrative support. 
Jurisdictions with tactical medics who become injured or killed in the warm zone may 
also be subject to liability lawsuits and possible safety standard violations. These costs 
may be offset, however, in that the ability of tactical medics to enter the warm zone to 
perform immediate rescue and life saving medical interventions protects a jurisdiction 
against lawsuits alleging a breach of the ‘duty to care.’  
8. Acceptability—Political and Cultural 
Tactical medic programs have good acceptability. Tactical medics have a proven 
record of success and can be found in many fire departments. Due to the extensive 
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training, well-developed protocols, appropriate protective equipment, and law 
enforcement protection, fire service leaders are comfortable sending tactical medics into 
warm zones. Since tactical medics remain a part of their fire or EMS service when not 
deployed with a SWAT team, no political concerns exist about police/fire consolidation.  
C.  TACTICAL LEVEL CONSOLIDATION—INDIVIDUALS WITH 
POLICE/FIRE/EMS CAPABILITY WORKING AS A TEAM IN THE HOT 
ZONE 
1. Safety 
The likely outcome of a consolidated police/fire team at a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment is mixed on the criterion of safety. 
Consolidated teams would have the highest level of training and equipment and would be 
able to defend themselves against assailants. However, consolidated teams would not be 
limited to the warm zone. Team members would be trained for tactical operations in the 
hot zone and would be at considerable risk of injury and death while operating therein.  
Although operating in the hot zone is dangerous, the training level of consolidated 
teams would increases their safety in the hot zone: they would be trained and equipped to 
handle an evolving hot zone, they could perform immediate rescue and mitigation in the 
warm zone and, if necessary, hot zone, and, the level of professional response would 
obviate the need for bystander intervention. 
2. Risk Management 
The risk management outcome of a consolidated team is likely to be good. 
Members of a consolidated team would be able to take calculated risks to save lives in 
any type of active shooter environment. 
3. Public Confidence 
The likely outcome of consolidated teams is an increase in confidence in public 




unlikely to find itself in a situation in which it would be unable to take reasonable action. 
In addition, the specialized capabilities of consolidated teams make ‘clever exploitation’ 
very unlikely.  
4. Adaptive to Multi-Hazard Environments, Especially Fire As a 
Weapon 
The likely outcome of a consolidated team in a novel, multi-hazard environment 
is good. A consolidated team brings the technical capabilities of law enforcement and fire 
fighters together in a milieu designed to overcome any type of adversity. Consolidated 
teams would have the time, funding, and resources to train extensively on policies and 
equipment to anticipate and mitigate any active shooter contingency.  
5. Expeditious 
The likelihood of an expeditious response by a consolidated team is mixed. Once 
on scene, a consolidated team could rapidly respond to any hazard in the warm or hot 
zone. However, due to practical limits on the number of consolidated teams and the 
amount of time it takes to deploy, response delays may occur.  
6. Collaborative 
Consolidated teams are more than collaborative—they are integrated. In a novel, 
multi-hazard environment, these elite ‘public safety officers’ would bring all the skills 
they need into the warm zone and the hot zone. According to Sean Newman, consolidated 
teams may facilitate inter-agency collaboration in other operational areas as well: “If 
successful, joint fire-police units created specifically for complex, active shooter terrorist 
attacks would serve as a catalyst for better agency cooperation.”145 
7. Cost 
Consolidated teams would be very expensive to maintain and operate. This kind 
of elite team would require advanced and continuous training, specialized equipment, 
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vehicles, and an extensive amount of administrative support. Jurisdictions with 
consolidated teams who have a member injured or killed in the hot zone or warm zone 
may also be subject to liability lawsuits and possible safety standard violations. These 
costs may be offset, however, in that the ability of consolidated teams to enter the hot 
zone to perform any required task would protect the jurisdiction from lawsuits alleging a 
breach of the ‘duty to care.’  
8. Acceptability–Political and Cultural 
Currently, the acceptability of consolidated teams in the fire service is poor. 
Although consolidated teams are still in the concept stage, to become reality, they must 
overcome several political and cultural obstacles. 
Advocates of consolidated teams may find it difficult to justify the expense of to 
political leaders. One of the experts interviewed in Sean Newman’s thesis stated, “‘I like 
the integration idea, but I would hesitate to say that I would be behind a dedicated team, 
partly because they would be underused.’ He went on to say that it would be difficult to 
justify the costs and manpower commitment associated with integrated teams to 
department leaders.”146 
A second obstacle is the issue of police/fire consolidation. As Theodore Moody 
emphasizes in his NPS thesis, improved tactical-level integration may be seen as 
weakening the argument against public safety officers.147 The active opposition by key 
fire service institutions makes significantly weakens the political acceptability of tactical 
level consolidated teams. 
Finally, since consolidated teams are still in the concept stage, it is difficult to 
fully assess their acceptability to fire fighters, police officers, or fire service leaders. On 
the one hand, consolidated team members would operate under well-developed protocols, 
receive advanced training, be provided with appropriate protective equipment, and be 
                                                 
146 Newman, “Braving the Swarm: Lowering Anticipated Group Bias in Integrated Fire/Police Units 
Facing Paramilitary Terrorism,” 48. 
147 Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial Response in the Age 
of Urban Jihad,” 57. 
 71
capable neutralizing assailants. However, consolidated teams would operate in the hot 
zone. Fire service leaders may not be comfortable sending fire fighters—even with police 
officer training—into combat zones. It may also be difficult to persuade fire fighters to 
learn the combat skills and mindset necessary for hot zone operations. 
D.  FORCE PROTECTION—POLICE ESCORT FIRE FIGHTERS INTO THE 
WARM ZONE 
1. Safety 
The likely safety outcome of a force protection policy at a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment is mixed. Fire fighters trained, 
equipped, and protected by a dedicated law enforcement team have taken steps to 
mitigate the risks of warm zone operation and are safer as a result. However, any policy 
that permits fire fighters to operate in areas of potential violence before the threat has 
been confirmed as neutralized puts fire fighters at risk of injury or death.  
The force protection model enhances fire fighters safety if the hot zone evolves. If 
an active shooter incident evolves into a cold zone, the fire fighters and police officers in 
that area will have the training to improvise an adaptive force protection solution to 
minimize the risks to responders and patients. 
The safety of force-protected fire fighters is significantly impacted by the 
availability of ballistic protection. A force protection policy may permit fire fighters to 
enter the warm zone without, or while waiting for ballistic protection, if immediate action 
is required. However, exposing fire fighters to potential violence in the warm zone of an 
active shooter incident without ballistic protection increases the risk of injury and death.  
Another breaking point of the force protection policy is insufficient training. 
Policies and protocols are most effective when drilled regularly. Due to the cost, 
logistical challenge, and competing training priorities, interagency active shooter force 
protection drills may not occur with optimal frequency. 
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2. Risk Management 
The likely risk management outcome of the force protection policy is good. Any 
responding fire fighters and police officers with appropriate training can take calculated 
risks to perform immediate rescues or mitigate life-threatening hazards in the warm zone.  
3. Public Confidence 
The likely effect on confidence in public safety officials of force-protected fire 
fighters is good. Any ad-hoc team of properly trained fire fighters and police officers can 
take immediate action in the warm zone. In addition, the tactical flexibility of force-
protected fire fighters makes the ‘clever exploitation’ of fire fighter inaction unlikely.  
4. Adaptive to a Multi-Hazard Environment, Especially Fire As a 
Weapon 
The likely outcome of a force protection policy in a novel, multi-hazard 
environment is good. An ad-hoc team of fire fighters, including those with specialized 
expertise in hazardous materials, CBRNE, or structural collapse, can work in the warm 
zone with the protection of law enforcement officers to adapt to the novel challenges of a 
multi-hazard environment.  
5. Expeditious 
The likelihood of an expeditious response by a force-protected team of fire 
fighters is good. The force protection model is not limited by the availability of 
specialized teams. Any ad-hoc team of first-in fire fighters and law enforcement officers 
with the appropriate training will be able to work together based on a common set of 
policies and protocols. A force-protected team of fire fighters can begin operations in the 
warm zone as soon as personnel are available.  
6. Collaborative 
On the criterion of collaboration, the likely outcome of a force protection policy is 
good. A force-protection team combines the agency specific capabilities of law 
enforcement—neutralize the suspect and protected the unarmed—with the agency 
 73
specific capabilities of fire fighters—rescue and hazard mitigation. Whereas the 
collaborative capacity of specialized units is limited to the team members, the force 
protection model enables any group of properly trained fire fighters or police officers to 
collaborate.  
7. Cost 
The cost of the force protection policy is mixed. Although training fire fighters 
and police officers on policy and protocols could most likely be accomplished within 
existing training budgets, interagency training under realistic scenarios and the purchase 
of ballistic protection would have a significant financial impact.  
Jurisdictions with fire fighters on a force-protection team injured or killed in the 
warm zone may also be subject to liability lawsuits and possible safety standard 
violations. These costs may be offset, however, in that the ability to enter the warm zone 
to perform any required task would protect the jurisdiction from lawsuits alleging a 
breach of the ‘duty to care.’  
8. Acceptability—Political and Cultural 
A force protection policy would have mixed political and cultural acceptability. 
The law enforcement escort model, which is similar to the force protection of fire 
fighters, is a fire service best practice at violent incidents of civil unrest. Public safety 
officials, fire service and law enforcement leaders, and the law enforcement and fire 
department cultures accept the escort model. 
Some reluctance on the part of fire service leaders and incident commanders to 
apply the law enforcement escort model to the warm zone of a paramilitary-style active 
shooter incident may occur. Although force protected fire fighters would be trained and 
equipped to operate in the warm zone, fire service leaders may not be comfortable 
sending fire fighters—even with law enforcement protection—into areas of potential 
paramilitary violence.  
The cultural acceptability of applying the force protection model to the warm 
zone of active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment has not been fully 
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explored. Data from a small survey conducted in the Puyallup, WA fire department and 
police department suggests that the force protection policy may have good acceptability. 
Participants in the survey were asked, “In your opinion, should Fire/EMS enter schools to 
rescue, treat immediate life threatening injuries, and extract shooting victims with a Law 
Enforcement Team?” Fifty-one percent of respondent fire fighters (20 of 39) said, “Yes, 
with proper training and life protecting equipment (ballistic vest).” Thirty percent of 
respondent fire fighters (11 of 39) stated that they were unsure at this point. In contrast, 
police officers were overwhelmingly supportive of the force protection policy. Ninety-
two percent (23 of 25) of police respondents replied, “Yes, with proper training and life 
protecting equipment (ballistic vest).” Only 4% (1 of 25) of police respondents reported 
being unsure.148  
Finally, it may be difficult for public safety officials to justify training and 
equipment to prepare for the rare and unlikely event of a paramilitary-style active shooter 
incident in a multi-hazard environment. On the other hand, the force protection model 
avoids the consolidation controversy.  
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VII. FINDINGS  
A. THE FIRE SERVICE HAS A CULTURE OF CALCULATED RISK 
ACCEPTANCE 
During paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment, 
fire fighters have taken risks to save lives. It should be expected that during the next 
paramilitary style attack, fire fighters will take risks to save lives—regardless of policy. 
Theodore Moody, who interviewed Mumbai fire fighters for his Naval Postgraduate 
School thesis, made a similar finding, “Fire service personnel in Mumbai, faced with the 
prospect of people trapped, injured, and dying inside the Taj Mahal Hotel and at other 
attack locations, chose to act immediately; we can be sure that fire fighters in the U.S. 
will do the same.”149  
B. AN EXPEDITIOUS RESPONSE WILL SAVE LIVES 
At Columbine and the 26/11 attack in Mumbai, the expeditious emergency 
response saved lives. The delayed response to Dave Sanders at Columbine and to 
Raymond Zach in Alameda County resulted in the unnecessary loss of life. The principles 
of the “golden hour” and tactical combat casualty care are based on empirical evidence 
that rapid medical intervention saves lives. The National Fire Protection Association 
Standard 1710 (2007 Edition) of four minute fire service response times to fires or other 
hazards is based on the evidence that rapid incident mitigation saves lives. At a 
paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment, an expeditious 
response will be necessary to save lives.  
Sean Newman reached a similar finding based on the observations made by the 
fire and police experts he interviewed for his NPS thesis. For Mumbai-type attacks, “an 
expeditious response, more than capability/capacity, was more of a concern for 
emergency responders, especially if multiple attacks occur simultaneously.”150  
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C. CHILDREN AS VICTIMS 
Another key finding is the recurring presence of children as victims of 
paramilitary-style active shooter incidents. Columbine, Beslan, Virginia Tech, and 
Norway all involved young students. The bombing of the Oklahoma City Murrah federal 
building in 1995 and the thwarted paramilitary style plot against the military entrance 
processing station in Seattle (2011), involved day cares. Fire fighters will risk a lot to 
save children. A zero-risk policy when children’s lives are in the balance is not consistent 
with the fire service principles of risk management, public expectations, or the legal ‘duty 
to care.’ 
D. INACTION LEADS TO A LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC SAFETY 
OFFICIALS 
A key finding of this inquiry is the loss of confidence in public safety officials at 
“standby” incidents—even if no adverse consequences occur. The incident of fire fighter 
inaction in Aurora, CO did not result in preventable injury or death. Yet, the perceived 
failure led to a reversal of the ‘scene safe’ protocols. When adverse consequences occur, 
the public outcry is swift and severe. For example, inaction when the lives of children are 
at stake will have catastrophic consequences for a community and its public safety 
officials.  
A common theme in most of the key events described in Chapter III is the 
availability of video footage—some of it in real time. Advances in video technology will 
compound the consequences of inaction on confidence in public safety officials. Since 
many cell phones now have cameras and/or video cameras, most fire fighter operations 
can be recorded and made publicly available for critique within moments of the event. 
Paramilitary-style active shooter attacks, which are designed to attract media coverage, 
may even be designed in a way that highlights fire fighter inaction. Real time footage of 
fire fighter inaction at an emergency can create a visceral reaction among viewers that 
could have lasting consequences for a fire department. 
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E. THE “STANDBY” POLICY IS NOT, IN PRACTICE, ZERO RISK  
Of the four policy alternatives, one would expect that the “standby” policy should 
result in the best safety for fire fighters. If fire fighters observe the “standby” policy and 
remain in the cold zone until the scene is secure, then they should be safe.  
A surprise finding, however, is the danger to fire fighters that occurs at the 
breaking points of the “standby” policy. Due to an evolving hot zone or the fire service 
culture of calculated risk acceptance, a likely outcome of the “standby” policy is that fire 
fighters will enter the warm zone if immediate action is required. At the fire in Freddy’s 
Fashion Mart, the shootings at Columbine, the Jewish Federation shooting in Seattle, and 
the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, fire fighters took action in the warm zone. At the next 
paramilitary-style active shooter attack in a multi-hazard environment, it should be 
expected that firefighters would take action in the warm zone—regardless of policy. 
F. “STANDBY” POLICIES DO NOT PREPARE FIRE FIGHTERS FOR THE 
WARM ZONE 
If fire fighters are not permitted or trained to enter the warm zone of an active 
shooter incident, then they will not be familiar with best practice protocols or possess 
equipment to mitigate hazards. Consequently, fire fighters who take action in the warm 
zone may be unequipped, uninformed about the nature of the risks, and untrained in the 
safest and most effective ways to operate. In addition, fire fighters who enter the warm 
zone in violation of policy may not fully communicate their actions, location, or 
situational awareness with command—which would only further imperil their rescue 
efforts. Sean Newman reached a similar finding in his NPS thesis, “Firefighters and 
emergency personnel may operate in a chaotic, active shooter environment to address 
life-safety, regardless of a lack of operating procedures and protocols.”151  
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G. ALL RESPONDERS MUST BE TRAINED TO ADAPT TO EVOLVING 
TERRORIST TACTICS 
Fire fighters at the next paramilitary-style active shooter attack are likely to be 
confronted with novel terrorist tactics in a multi-hazard environment, which will test the 
first-in units in unprecedented ways. A thinking enemy who has learned from and 
adapted to the weaknesses in U.S. response protocols will be trying to kill for as long as 
possible. To overcome these challenges, adaptation by on-scene units will be critical. 
Safety, effectiveness, and “pre-incident innovation”152 are all improved with practice and 
familiarity.  
Since it is impossible to predict in advance which individual fire fighters or law 
enforcement officers will be first in to a paramilitary style attack, all responders must be 
appropriately trained. This has the added benefit that if a skill is needed to mitigate an 
innovative constellation of hazards in the warm zone, and a fire fighter with that skill is 
among the responding fire fighters, then that fire fighter can be made available in the 
warm zone. Furthermore, since paramilitary style attacks require law enforcement 
officers and fire fighters to work together, a critical aspect of that training is inter-
department collaboration. Sean Newman, in his NPS thesis, made similar findings about 
the importance of department-wide training in both agencies, “The key finding, which 
may or may not, contrast with the idea of a dedicated interagency response unit, calls for 
respective agency-wide awareness and training for a Mumbai style event, from the 
command to unit level.”153  
H. POLICE/FIRE COLLABORATION OVERCOMES SINGLE-AGENCY 
MITIGATION STRATEGY LIMITATIONS 
At paramilitary-style active shooter incidents, fire departments and law 
enforcement agencies have complementary capabilities that can overcome single-agency 
limitations. Law enforcement officers are not generally trained to provide immediate 
medical care or mitigate fire used as a weapon. Fire fighters are not trained or equipped 
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to operate in potentially violent conditions. Working together, however, fire fighters can 
save lives and mitigate hazards in the warm zone under the protection of police officers. 
I. BARRIERS TO COLLABORATION REMAIN 
It is possible that the collaboration at previous paramilitary-style active shooter 
incidents is a byproduct of the intensity of the event. Responders are more likely to put 
aside organizational differences when a crisis demands immediate action. During routine 
interaction, in contrast, collaboration may be made more difficult by politics, rivalries, 
cultural clashes, labor-relations disagreements, and competition for scarce resources. In 
the absence of a crisis, it is hard to sustain commitment to making difficult organizational 
changes necessary for collaboration to succeed.  
Despite the awareness that law enforcement and fire department collaboration is 
critical at paramilitary active shooter incidents, few departments have formal 
collaborative policies or training in place. In fact, Sean Newman indicated in his NPS 
thesis that even though FDNY and NYPD are the two most experienced U.S. fire and 
police agencies with actual terrorist attacks, “Fifteen years after Freddy’s [1995], many of 
the inter-agency operational and communication deficiencies revealed during the incident 
have yet to be resolved…”154  
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VIII. CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. THE FIRE SERVICE MUST ADOPT A NEW CORE COMPETENCY: 
WARM ZONE OPERATIONS AT PARAMILITARY STYLE ATTACKS  
The calculated acceptance of risk is an integral part of the fire service culture and 
tradition. The fire service rules of engagement—risk a lot, in a calculated way, to save 
savable lives—reflect a careful balancing of safety and action. Calculated risk taking is 
what the public expects of fire fighters, and it is what the fire service expects of its fire 
fighters.  
The actions of the fire fighters who responded to the 9/11 terrorist attacks are 
instructive on this point. On 9/11, the fire fighters of the FDNY and the National Capital 
Region went in to fight the fires and assist the evacuation despite the risk and uncertainty. 
These fire fighters did not stand by outside of the collapse zone and wait for the incident 
to stabilize. Although the FDNY paid a heavy price, their calculated risk taking saved 
countless lives and epitomized the best qualities of the fire service.  
It can be argued that the fire service rules of engagement only apply to hazards 
that are core competencies for the fire service—such as the fires and risks of structural 
collapse on 9/11. According to this argument, gunfire, explosions, and a thinking 
adversary at a paramilitary style attack are not risks that the fire service is trained or 
equipped to handle.  
This argument overlooks the fire service’s storied history of incorporating new 
core competencies. Hazardous materials, technical rescues, infectious disease, and 
CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) weapons–all have 
successfully been incorporated into the fire service mission. For each new hazard, the fire 
service has trained its responders and provided policies and equipment to mitigate the 
risks in a way that balances the need to save lives with fire fighter safety. 
The incorporation of new core competencies flows logically from the nature of 
the fire service mission. If fire fighters are to protect life and property from fire, medical 
emergency, and other disasters, then the fire service cannot ignore new and evolving 
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historical trends. Although it may be difficult to recognize emerging historical trends in 
the early stages, changes in technology and society inevitably affect the fire service 
mission.  
The evolving nature of paramilitary style attacks is an emerging historical trend 
that directly impacts the fire service. As more paramilitary-style active shooter incidents 
occur in the future, the presence of–and the need for—fire fighters in the warm zone will 
become increasingly apparent. The importance of this finding cannot be overemphasized: 
A predictable outcome of paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard 
environment is the need for fire fighters in the warm zone.  
With the incorporation of each new core competency into the fire service, fire 
fighters have demonstrated that they can learn to take calculated risks to save lives. Fire 
fighters can be trusted to enter the warm zone of a paramilitary style attack safely when 
compelling reason occurs.  
B. THE FIRE SERVICE MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THE BREAKING 
POINTS OF THE “STANDBY” POLICY 
When the next paramilitary-style active shooter incident occurs in the United 
States, the standby policy may lead to unnecessary loss of life and set fire fighters up for 
failure. In a moment of great national trauma playing out on television screens around the 
world, when innocent men, women, and children need rescue—when fire fighters are 
needed most—fire fighters may be standing by two blocks away. Such inaction is not 
consistent with the fire service mission, the expectations of the nation, or with the 
tradition of courage in the face of catastrophic terrorism embodied by the fire fighters of 
the National Capital Region and the FDNY on 9/11. 
The “standby” policy is also likely to fail on what appears to be its strongest 
quality—fire fighter safety. The findings of this inquiry unequivocally demonstrate that 
the fire service expects its fire fighters to act when lives hang in the balance—even if the 
“standby” policy dictates otherwise. After the perceived failure of the Aurora, CO, ‘scene 
safe’ protocols, a Denver Fire spokesman unintentionally articulated the hypocrisy of the  
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“standby” policy: “We want police to secure the scene first because we can't defend 
ourselves. But if someone has fatal injuries, we will ignore the policy and go in. We have 
plenty of guys who will break protocol in that case and just go in.”155  
The fire service engages in a dangerous charade when it relies on a “standby” 
policy it expects to be ignored. Once the fire service admits the inevitability—if not the 
expectation—of fire fighters operating in the warm zone to make immediate rescues 
during paramilitary attacks, then the true danger of the “standby” policy is revealed, the 
risks to fire fighter safety from the lack of training, equipment, and protocols.  
The willful blindness of the “standby” policy to warm zone operations during 
paramilitary style attacks prevents the fire service from recognizing the need to provide 
fire fighters with the tools and training to operate safely at these incidents. The absence of 
such policies and training places a tremendous burden on the first-in fire officers, as they 
will be required to make life or death decisions without guidance or instruction. In the 
past, when the fire service has incorporated new hazards into core competencies, fire 
fighters have been provided with training, equipment, and protocols to mitigate the risks 
in a way that balances the need to save lives with fire fighter safety. The fire service has 
not fulfilled its obligation to provide fire fighters with training, protocols, and equipment 
to operate with reasonable safety at a paramilitary style attack. 
C. THE FIRE SERVICE SHOULD ADOPT A FORCE PROTECTION 
MODEL OF RESPONSE FOR PARAMILITARY STYLE ATTACKS 
Force protection is the optimal fire department policy for safe and rapid access to 
victims in need of rescue or hazards in need of mitigation at paramilitary-style active 
shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment. A review of the likely outcomes of the 
force protection model at a paramilitary style attacks is consistently good—and superior 
to the alternatives. A force protection policy allows calculated risk taking, is consistent 
with public expectations, is adaptive in novel multi-hazard environments, is expeditious, 
and is collaborative with law enforcement.  
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Force protection stands out for the expeditiousness of its response. Most major 
metropolitan fire departments can have at least four fire fighters at the scene of an 
incident within four minutes. If another incident occurs simultaneously elsewhere in the 
jurisdiction, at least four more fire fighters will be on-scene within four minutes. The 
number of on-duty fire units in a city and its surrounding jurisdictions is the only limit on 
the expeditiousness of fire department response. If law enforcement response is similarly 
swift, then a force-protected team of fire fighters can be ready to enter the warm zone 
within minutes of incident onset. As the seconds tick away from the “golden hour” or a 
fire rapidly grows in size, the most expeditious response is a team of fire fighters 
protected by police officers. Although specialized teams may have greater capability than 
first-in fire units, they cannot compete in terms of expeditiousness. 
The expeditiousness of the force protection model can be contrasted with the 
inevitability of fatal response delays of specialized teams. Although the shootings at 
Virginia Tech are considered a success of the tactical medic model, the circumstances of 
the shootings produced the life saving result—not the policy. The tactical medics were 
available to respond rapidly to the Norris Hall shootings only because they had been 
mobilized for the earlier shootings at West Ambler Johnston. If the tactical medics had 
not been activated for the earlier shooting, their response to Norris Hall would have been 
delayed, and a number of students may have died in the 19 minutes it took for SWAT 
teams to make the scene secure enough for the first in fire fighters.  
The response delay with specialized teams is a recurring theme in studies on 
paramilitary style attacks. According to Theodore Moody in his NPS thesis, “Delays are 
inherent with specialized teams, and delays cost lives and provide attackers time to create 
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“Even with the appropriate training, the police source anticipates that the integrated team 
could not be formed and ready to enter a hostile environment fast enough for most active 
shooter incidents.”157 
The force protection model also overcomes the other key weaknesses of 
specialized teams. Whereas tactical medics must remain in close medical support of their 
SWAT team and are limited in a multi-hazard environment, force protected fire fighters 
may act immediately in novel multi-threat environments. Whereas consolidated teams are 
controversial and still in the conceptual phase, the ‘escort’ model of force protection is 
familiar to fire fighters and police officers and has proven its value during civil unrest.  
Force protection for fire fighters in the warm zone of a paramilitary-style active 
shooter incident has three primary weaknesses. The application of the ‘escort’ model of 
force protection to active shooter incidents is a relatively new context in the fire service. 
Although reasons exist to believe that the fire service would accept a force protection 
model—acceptance of the similar ‘escort’ model at incidents of civil unrest and 
preliminary survey results—development of this policy is still in its early stages.  
The acceptance of the force protection model may become stronger over time as 
the fire service learns from paramilitary-style active shooter incidents. Furthermore, 
questions of acceptability and best practices for force protected fire fighters in the warm 
zone may prove to be valuable lines of future research. 
The second weakness of the force protections model is the availability of ballistic 
protection. The cost of providing ballistic protection for every fire fighter, or even 
making sets of ballistic protection available on each fire apparatus, is prohibitive for 
many jurisdictions.  
It may be possible to overcome this weakness with creative solutions that provide 
fire fighters in the warm zone with an appropriate level of protection. One option is 
caches of body armor that can be rapidly deployed in the event of a paramilitary-style 
active shooter incident. Other options may also be investigated, such as dual use police 
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riot shields that can serve as bullet-resistant cover, which may be another area of future 
research that could significantly improve fire fighter safety at active shooter incidents. 
The third weakness of the force protection model is the challenge of justifying the 
expense of training and equipment to prepare for the rare and unlikely event of a 
paramilitary-style active shooter incident in a multi-hazard environment. This may be the 
most difficult challenge to overcome.  
The justification for the expense of preparing for paramilitary style attacks should 
become more evident as the fire service educates its communities about the threat. 
Paramilitary-style active shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment, like 
earthquakes, are rare events. However, they are both well-identified hazards for which 
fire departments must be prepared. After the shootings at Columbine and the 26/11 
attacks in Mumbai, public safety officials cannot claim ignorance of this threat. Failing to 
prepare in the hope that ‘It won’t happen here’ is not a reliable policy approach.  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) riots in 2000, also known as the ‘Battle in 
Seattle,’ are instructive on this point. One reason that the City of Seattle was not prepared 
for the level of violence was the belief that Seattle was different—riots would not happen 
here. The Seattle Police Department (SPD), in its WTO after action report, observed, “In 
retrospect, SPD commanders put their faith in historical precedent… we relied on our 
knowledge of past demonstrations, concluding that the ‘worst case’ would not happen 
here.”158 After the worst case did occur, the Seattle Police Department resolved not to 
make the same mistake again, “In retrospect, we relied too much on our collective 
memory of recent history (‘fighting the last war’) and placed too little credence on 
intelligence that ultimately proved to be accurate (‘the new war’). In the future, SPD must 
be the bearer of bad news and, quite simply, assert serious misgivings about missions 
where there is not a realistic expectation of success.”159 Fire departments would be well  
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served to heed the experience of the Seattle Police Department and assert serious 
misgivings about underfunding preparations for a paramilitary style attack because they 
‘will not happen here.’ 
D. JOINT POLICE/FIRE TASK FORCE ON PARAMILITARY STYLE 
ATTACKS 
Development of a robust fire service response policy to paramilitary-style active 
shooter incidents in a multi-hazard environment is in its early stages. Although key 
patterns are beginning to emerge, a considerable amount of work remains to be done. The 
decentralized nature of the fire service continues to work against the development of a 
well-developed policy. Isolated fire departments may be innovating partial solutions to 
some of the challenges, but no formal clearinghouse to share those lessons exists.  
A key obstacle to fire service response policy development is the need for inter-
agency cooperation with law enforcement. Few formal inter-agency linkages exist to 
disseminate the lessons that law enforcement is learning in the development of active 
shooter protocols. Furthermore, aside from the trial and error of inter-agency drills and 
exercises on paramilitary style attacks, few forums exist for police and fire to work 
collaboratively on this issue.  
Two decades ago, the fire service and law enforcement confronted a similar 
challenge–consolidating and refining policies and procedures to deal with civil unrest. 
After the April 1992 Los Angeles riots that occurred in the wake of the Rodney King 
verdict, the Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA) and the United States 
Fire Administration brought together fire chiefs, police chiefs, and experts from around 
the nation to answer that challenge. The task force was a model of successful 
collaboration, “For the first time in recent memory, police and fire executives were able 
to sit and work together, to voice their concerns and wishes, and to come to a basic 
agreement on how their personnel can best cooperate in the field.”160 
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Today’s challenge is consolidating and refining policies and procedures to deal 
with paramilitary style attacks. The threat to homeland security from a paramilitary style 
attack is clear and gaps in fire service response have been identified. A joint police/fire 
task force—before, rather than after, such an attack occurs in the United States—may be 
called for once again.  
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